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The authors take up the challenge that was thrown down by the Ford v. Town of Grafton court. The first part
of this Article examines the somewhat tortured and fascinating history of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act.
It then describes the arguments Catherine Ford made, how the court responded, and why it responded as it
did. In Part II, Massachusetts' strong commitment to protecting and assisting victims of domestic violence is
examined. A variety of legislative, executive and judicial initiatives that demonstrate commitment are
described, but the Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 209A, the restraining order statute, is emphasized.
The article reveals a clear legislative and judicial intent to grant victims of domestic violence meaningful
protection from abuse. Part III of this Article analyzes cases from several other states that mirror the factual
circumstances of Ford. This Article also reflects upon the judiciary's repeated invitations to the legislature to
clarify or amend the immunity legislation, and suggests several ways that the domestic violence and immunity
laws could be changed in a manner consistent with judicial and legislative intent. Lastly, this Article concludes
with a warning. Without clarifying the relationship between domestic violence laws and the Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act in a manner that enables courts to hold police and other municipal actors liable for failing to
enforce restraining orders, such orders offer no protection to victims.
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Judicial Deference or Bad Law: Why Massachusetts Courts Will
Not Impose Municipal Liability for Failure to Enforce
Restraining Orders

Jennifer Dieringer & Carolyn Grose t
Copyright © 2005 Jennifer Dieringer & Carolyn Grose
On May 31, 2002, Henry Trudeau fatally stabbed Karen Trudeau, his wife of
seventeen years and the mother of his two children. I Henry then committed
suicide. 2 Upon learning Karen's fate, citizens from Blandford and other
surrounding Massachusetts communities expressed disbelief and outrage. 3
They directed their anger not only at Henry, but also at local law enforcement
agencies for failing to do more to protect Karen. They knew that Karen "did
what she could. After her husband punched her, destroyed her belongings and
threatened her, [she] got a restraining order. And when Henry Trudeau
repeatedly violated it, she filed five criminal complaints.',4
Indeed, the police had arrested Henry and charged him for violating the
restraining order just two months before he killed Karen. 5 In that instance,
however, the court released him without bai1.6 Following his release, Karen
complained three times within a ten-day period that Henry continued to violate
the restraining order--complaints that advocates say were stalled in the courts,

t Jennifer Dieringer works as a staff attorney at Western Massachusetts Legal Services and specializes
in family and housing law. Ms. Dieringer is currently an adjunct instructor at Bay Path College, and has
previously taught in an adjunct capacity at the University of Connecticut School of Law and the University of
Massachusetts. Carolyn Grose is a Practitioner in Residence at American University's Washington College of
Law, where she teaches the Women and the Law Clinic. Prior to teaching at the Washington College of Law,
Ms. Grose worked as an Assistant Clinical Professor at the University of Connecticut School of Law. As a
Skadden Fellow, she also worked at Western Massachusetts Legal Services and specialized in child support and
other aspects of family law. The authors felt inspired to write this article based upon their experiences as
family lawyers, and hope that it serves as a useful tool for practitioners and advocates who represent and lobby
on behalf of victims of domestic violence. The authors would like to thank the army of research assistants
without whom this project would never have been completed: Paulina Petrakopoulos, Suzanne Patrick, Emily
Curtler, and Gina Beck. The authors would also like to thank John Frey, Peter Grose, Margaret Johnson, and
Susie Schmeiser, for their close reading and encouragement.
1. Associated Press, Task Force Faults DA, Courts for Not Protecting Abuse Victim, BOSTON HERALD
ONLINE, Jan. 23, 2004, at http://business.bostonherald.comlbusinessNews/view.bg?articleid=2368&format=
text.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Associated Press, supra note I.
6. Associated Press, supra note I.
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thus allowing Henry to remain a deadly threat to Karen. 7
In the wake of this local tragedy, advocates formed a task force to
investigate the events surrounding Karen's death. The task force ultimately
issued a report critical of the District Attorney's Office and the courts for
failing to provide Karen with sufficient protection. 8 The text of the report
suggested that Karen would still be alive if the system had functioned in a
proper manner. 9 This underlying assertion echoed the sentiments of her
brother-in-law, who declared that, "Karen sincerely thought that going to the
court would have protected her. ... But the system didn't work for her. It
failed her miserably in myeyes.,,10
Did the failures of the District Attorney's Office and the courts to provide
Karen with sufficient protection rise to the level of negligence? If so, might
that negligence represent a cause of Karen's death? The Hampden County
District Attorney, William Bennett, is currently looking into the matter. I I Yet,
even if a prosecutorial body were to find that these governmental failures
constituted negligence, and that such failures did contribute to Karen's death,
any suit alleging municipal negligence probably would not succeed.
Unfortunately, Karen Trudeau's circumstance represents the most recent
manifestation of a twenty-five-year-old history of misunderstanding,
misrepresentation, judicial reticence and legislative carelessness that has
resulted in a landscape where no court in Massachusetts would hold municipal
actors liable in negligence for failing to enforce domestic violence laws. This
Article examines that landscape.
Almost twenty years before Karen Trudeau received her ultimately
ineffective restraining order, another Massachusetts woman, Catherine Ford,
obtained a restraining order to prohibit her husband, James Davidson, from
abusing her, and requiring that he stay away from her home and her place of
work. 12 Pursuant to Massachusetts General Laws chapter 209A, the police,
once notified of the order, had a duty to arrest James for violating any of the
order's provisions.
Over the next fifteen months, however, James continued to abuse Catherine
by stalking her, calling her, and threatening to kill her. Catherine notified the
Grafton police after each instance that James contacted her. The police,
however, told her that there was nothing they could do. Indeed, one officer
advised Catherine to purchase a firearm so that she may protect herself.
Catherine received her final death threat on January 17, 1986. On that day,

7. Associated Press, supra note 1.
8. Southern Hilltown Domestic Violence Task Force, The Domestic Violence Murder of Karen Trudeau:
A Review of the Judicial System's Response (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
9. Id.
10. Associated Press, supra note I.
11. Associated Press, supra note I.
12. Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 1049 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
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James went to her home and shot her in the face and neck, leaving her a
' \3
qua dril
p eglc.
Catherine subsequently sued the Town of Grafton for failing to safeguard
her from her abusive husband. In a powerful opinion in Ford v. Town of
Grafton l4 that spelled out every detail of Catherine's ordeal with James, the
Massachusetts Court of Appeals held that the police had negligently failed to
enforce the restraining order. ls The court declared that, had the police done
their job, Catherine might never have suffered such a horrible deprivation of
physical and psychological well-being. 16 The court ultimately concluded,
however, that the Town of Grafton stood as a governmental entity, and thus had
immunity from suit under the Massachusetts Tort Claims ActY Although the
court revealed feelings of sympathy for Catherine, it nonetheless insisted that it
was bound by the legislature's grant of sovereign immunity within the Act. 18
In concluding its opinion, the court invited the legislature to amend that Act if
it wished to hold police liable for failing to enforce restraining orders: 9
In this Article, we take up the challenge that was thrown down by the Ford
court. The first part of this Article examines the somewhat tortured and
fascinating history of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act. We then describe the
arguments Catherine Ford made, how the court responded, and why it
responded as it did. In Part II, we examine Massachusetts' strong commitment
to protecting and assisting victims of domestic violence. We describe a variety
of legislative, executive and judicial initiatives that demonstrate that
commitment, but focus on Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 209A, the
restraining order statute. In so doing we reveal a clear legislative and judicial
intent to grant victims of domestic violence meaningful protection from abuse.
Despite these efforts to shield domestic abuse victims from further harm,
Massachusetts courts stand as the nation's only judiciary that refuses to hold
police liable for failing to enforce restraining orders. In Part III of this Article,
we analyze cases from several other states that mirror the factual circumstances
of Ford. In these cases, however, each court held that the police were not
entitled to immunity from suit because they shared a special relationship with
the victims whom they failed to protect.
This Article also reflects upon the judiciary's repeated invitations to the
legislature to clarify or amend the immunity legislation, and suggests several
ways that the domestic violence and immunity laws could be changed in a
manner consistent with judicial and legislative intent. Lastly, this Article

13. /d. at 1051.
14. 693 N.E.2d 1047 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
15. ld. at 1053.
16. ld. (noting town's negligence may be reasonably inferred from evidence).
17. ld. (indicating statute immunizes police from tort liability).
18. Ford, 693 N.E.2d at 1057.
19. /d. (declaring Massachusetts citizens may choose by legislation to hold towns and officials liable).
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concludes with a warning. In light of the United States Supreme Court's
decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services,2o
rejecting the idea that the Constitution imposes general affirmative duties on
state actors to protect individuals from private violence,21 state courts and tort
laws exist as a domestic violence victim's last recourse?2 If these courts are
incapable of ensuring that law enforcement agencies enforce domestic violence
laws, this recourse lacks real meaning. Without clarifying the relationship
between domestic violence laws and the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act in a
manner that enables courts to hold police and other municipal actors liable for
failing to enforce restraining orders, such orders offer no protection to victims
like Catherine Ford and Karen Trudeau.
I. THE MASSACHUSETTS TORT CLAIMS ACT

The history of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act is a fascinating look at the
"call and response" patterns shared between the judiciary and the legislature.
This dialogue, although continuing to this day, has yet to produce any lasting
solutions. The most recent "call" from the judiciary seems have occurred in
Ford, where the court once again requested legislative clarification regarding
the ACt. 23

A. The Act Itself: A Waiver ofImmunity for Public Employers
In an attempt to revise the common law doctrine of governmental tort
immunity, the Massachusetts Legislature enacted the Tort Claims ACt. 24 The
concept of governmental tort immunity arises from the doctrine of sovereign
inununity, which enables governmental units to enjoy absoiute immunity from

20. 489 U.s. 189 (1989).
21. DeShaney, 489 U.s. at 199-200. In rejecting Catherine Ford's due process claim, the Ford court
relied upon DeShaney for its determination that the town did not violate her rights by failing to protect her. See
Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 1056 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). The Ford court's reliance upon the
Supreme Court's holding in DeShaney demonstrated the tremendous effect that this landmark decision has
commanded over similar actions. See generally James T.R. Jones, Battered Spouses' Section 1983 Damage
Actions Against the Unresponsive Police after DeShaney, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 251 (1990-91) (detailing effects
of Deshaney on due process claims for failure to protect). In Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, the United
States Supreme Court will consider a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in a case involving a woman whose
children were killed by their father after she asked the police to enforce her protection order and arrest him.
See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 417 (2004) (granting certiorari). The Colorado district court
and Tenth Circuit rejected the substantive due process claim, relying upon the DeShaney decision, but the
Tenth Circuit supported the procedural due process claim. See Marcia Coyle, Justices to Weigh Orders of
Protection to Decide if Police Are Liable, NAT'L L.J, Mar. 7, 2005, at I.
22. See Laura S. Harper, Battered Women Suing Police for Failure to Intervene: Viable Legal Avenues
after DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 75 CORNELL L. REv. 1393, 1424-25
(1990) (identifying state courts as more hospitable forum for remedying violations of battered women's rights).
23. See Ford, 693 N.E.2d at 1057 (determining current statute bars plaintiff from recovery).
24. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § I (2002); see also Joseph W. Glannon, Governmental Tort Liability
under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act of 1978,66 MAss. L. REv. 7, 7 (1981).
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tort claims?5 The impetus for this legislative action, however, did not arise
from either house. Rather, lawmakers enacted these changes in response to the
Supreme Judicial Court's threat to abrogate the common law principle of public
immunity that it had traditionally relied upon in the absence of statutory
gUl'dance. 26
The text of the Act provides that, except under certain circumstances, public
employers may be sued and held liable for the negligence of their employees. 27
When reflecting upon the purpose of the Act, the judiciary explained that it
served to "provide an effective remedy for persons injured as a result of the
negligence of governmental entities in the Commonwealth.,,28 Thus, while a
plaintiff must still establish the common law or statutory elements of a
negligence action as required in suits against private parties, the legislature
intended that the Act be "construed liberally for the accomplishment of [its]
purpose. ,,29
B. Judicial Reaction to the Legislature: Exceptions, and Exceptions to the
Exceptions

In adopting the Act, the Massachusetts Legislature sought to "replace the
Byzantine intricacies of the common law with a simple, coherent and
comprehensive system governing all negligence claims against public
employers.,,3o
Unfortunately, the Supreme Judicial Court's subsequent
interpretations of the Act constructed a level of complexity that continues to
puzzle practitioners and academics alike. These interpretations have obstructed
the development of what was originally considered to be a "fair, sensible and
reasonably simple system of compensation for damages and injuries arising out
of public activities.,,31 In tum, cases following the Act's initial passage created
25. See Mark L. Van Valkenburgh, Note, Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 258, § /0: Slouching
Toward Sovereign Immunity, 29 NEW ENG. L. REv. l079, 1081 (1995). The doctrine of sovereign immunity
originated in Great Britain, and rested upon the premise that the King could not be subjected to suit because
there was no court above him, and thus no court could enforce a claim against him. Id.
26. See generally Whitney v. Worcester, 366 N.E.2d 1210 (Mass. 1977); Morash & Sons, Inc. v.
Commonwealth, 296 N.E.2d 46l (Mass. 1973).
27. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2. The Act provides a cause of action for "injury or loss of property
or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any public employee while
acting within the scope of his office or employment," and provides for liability up to a limit of $100,000. Id.
With respect to the definition of "public employer," the Act interprets the term broadly to include cities, towns,
counties, the commonwealth, local boards, districts, commissions, and virtually any other institution that
discharges public functions. See Glannon, supra note 24, at 10.
28. Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d l292, 1299 (Mass. 1984) (citing Vasys v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n,
438 N.E.2d 836, 839 (Mass. 1982». In the Vasys opinion, the court noted that the Tort Claims Act provides
claimants with valid causes of action to pursue negligent governmental entities while providing safeguards to
ensure the stability and effectiveness of the state's government. See Vasys v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n, 438
N.E.2d 836, 840 (Mass. 1982).
29. Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1299 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 2).
30. See Glannon, supra note 24, at 19.
31. See Glannon, supra note 24, at 22 (contending statute produces fair result in spite of Supreme Judicial
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exceptions that proved so unwieldy that the judiciary ultimately gave up trying
to interpret and implement the Act. Frustrated, the Massachusetts judiciary
ultimately lobbed the concept of tort liability and immunity back into the hands
of the legislature.
1. The Public Duty Rule

Almost immediately after the Act's passage, the Massachusetts judiciary
expressed its dissatisfaction with the legislature's handiwork by injecting
common law into the statutory scheme. In 1982, the court began limiting the
breadth of the Act by establishing fact patterns under which public actors
would enjoy immunity from liability. As it limited the effects of the Act, the
judiciary primarily relied upon the common law public duty rule. This rule
establishes that a breach of duty to the general public does not give rise to
.
. 32
pnvate
tort causes 0 f actIOn.
Despite its own decision to invoke the public duty rule, the Supreme Judicial
Court labeled it ''unfair, unwise, and antithetical to traditional tort goals of lossspreading and victim compensation, and a resurrection of sovereign immunity
in disguise.,,33 The court itself recognized the irony of its application of the
public duty rule, noting that it may ultimately lead to the creation of broadbased municipal tort immunity.34 It reasoned that, "whereas most public
employees when acting within the scope of their employment ultimately are
doing so in furtherance of the public good broadly defined, the principle of
'public duty' [applied here could] exempt public employers from tort liability
for the negligence of most public employees.,,35
2. An Exception to the Exception: The Special Relationship Doctrine

Two years after the Supreme Judicial Court invoked the public duty rule, the
court ultimately sought to limit its applicability by invoking the special
relationship rule. 36 Based in common law, this exception applies "when a
citizen becomes singled out from the general population and a special duty is
owed [to] him by the governmental entity.,,37 In such a situation, this exception
Court's interpretations).
32. Joseph W. Glannon & Bennett S. Gordon, Practice and Procedure Under the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act (G.L. c.258), 71 MAss. L. REv. 61, 70 (1986) (citing Dinsky v. Town of Framingham, 438 N.E.2d
51, 53-56 (Mass. 1982».
33. See Van Valkenburgh, supra note 25, at 1089 (citing inter alia Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622, 657 (1980».
34. See Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1300 (Mass. 1984) (highlighting municipality's
argument against liability).
35. /d. (describing application of public duty principle).
36. [d. at 1303-04 (adopting special relationship rule).
37. John H. Derrick, Annotation, Modem Status a/Rule Excusing Governmental Unitfrom Tort Liability
on Theory That Only General, Not Particular, Duty Was Owed Under Circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, 1196
(1985).
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prevents the otherwise applicable public duty rule from providing immunity for
the negligent state actor.
In Irwin v. Town of Ware,38 police officers detained, but failed to arrest, a
drunk driver who subsequently caused a fatal accident. 39 Despite the fact that
the police did not create the risk that caused the accident, the Supreme Judicial
Court concluded that the police owed a special duty to the accident victims. 4o
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon the foreseeability and
immediacy of the harm, and reasoned that potential victims of drunk drivers
lack the ability to protect themselves from harm.41
The Irwin court premised its ruling that the police officers were not immune
from suit upon a two-pronged analysis. First, the court found a special
relationship exception to the public duty rule and then applied traditional tort
standards to determine negligence. 42
The court's analysis, however,
demonstrated the difficulty of overcoming the public duty rule by invoking the
special relationship exception, as well as the court's narrow application of that
exception. Indeed, between 1985 and 1989, the court found a special
· h"Ip m on1y one other case. 43
re 1atlOns
3. The Judiciary's Threat to Abolish the Public Duty Rule

For the fifteen years that followed the passage of the Act, the Supreme
Judicial Court continued to employ a mixed common law and statutory
approach when deciding governmental tort cases. The court, however, finally
lost its patience with the state of the law and announced its intention to abolish
the public duty rule due to its inconsistency with the Tort Claims Act. 44 In
Jean W. v. Commonwealth,45 the court acknowledged that, in its attempt to
"distinguish viable claims from those subject to dismissal by use of the public
38. 467 N.E.2d 1292 (Mass. 1984).
39. See id. at 1295 (stating relevant factual history).
40. !d. at 1303-04 (concluding police possess duty to public when confronting iotoxicated motorists).
41. Jd. at 1311. The court declared: "Where the risk created by the negligence of a municipal employee
is of immediate and foreseeable physical injury to persons who cannot reasonably protect themselves from it, a
duty of care reasonably should be found." Id. at 1300.
42. See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1303-07 (acknowledgiog special relationship rule and determining police
acted negligently).
43. A.L. v. Commonwealth. 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1032 (Mass. 1988). In this case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that a probation officer, who was specifically ordered to prevent a sex offender
from working with young boys, possessed a special duty to a subsequent victim of that offender. Id.; see Jean
W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 309-10 (Mass. 1993) (discussing five cases where court declined to
find existence of special relationship). Due to the lack of black letter law regarding the required standard under
the special relationship doctrine, this area of law is plagued by confusion and inconsistency. A striking
example of such inconsistency may be uncovered by comparing the Irwin fact pattern with a similar case from
Connecticut. In Shore v. Town of Stonington, the court held that a police officer's failure to detain a drunk
driver did not create a special relationship between the police and the plaintiff who was iojured by the drunk
driver. 444 A.2d 1379, 1381-82 (Conn. 1982).
44. Jean W.o 610 N.E.2d at 307.
45. 610 N.E.2d 305 (Mass. 1993).
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duty-special relationship dichotomy," it had failed to produce a rule of
predictable application. 46 Indeed, after reflecting upon prior relevant decisions,
the court noted that it had essentially resurrected "the antiquated and outmoded
concepts of sovereign immunity which [it] and the Legislature have sought to
shed.''''7
Regardless of its aggressive posture, the court assured lawmakers that it
would not act until the conclusion of the 1993 legislative session, thus
providing the legislature with an opportunity to respond if it "believes that
certain activities require more stringent protection.''''8 The court's opinion also
provided Massachusetts lawmakers with examples of statutory responses that
other states had adopted when facing similar situations. 49 Despite these
suggestions, the court cautioned that it did not seek "to suggest to the
Legislature how it should proceed.,,5o The court acknowledged that the
legislature might ultimately favor the existing statutory limitations on liability
and decline to respond to the court's decision. 51
Despite their apparent uniformity, the justices clearly did not all agree with
the decision to abolish the public duty rule. For example, Justice Greaney's
concurrence warned that the abolition of the public duty rule "could lead to a
deluge of lawsuits against governmental entities, particularly municipalities."s2
Justices O'Connor, Nolan, and Lynch clearly embraced the public duty rule,
opining that the court's rejection of it was "a serious mistake. ,,53 Each of these
justices contended that the Act did not require the court to abandon its use of
the public duty rule. 54 Specifically, these three justices reasoned that it was not
necessarily inconsistent to apply both the Act and the common law public duty
doctrine together as the court had previously done. 55 This absence of cohesion
among the justices suggests that the judiciary might not have followed through
with its threat to abolish the rule had the legislature failed to amend the Act.

Id. at 307 (noting court's inconsistent application resulting from exceptions).
Id. (justifying abolishment of public duty rule as inconsistent with statutory law).
Id. (defining issue to legislature).
Jean w., 610 N.E.2d at 314 (listing other states' legislative responses to similar issues).
Id. at 314 n.12.
Id. at 314 (stating legislature may choose not to take any action).
Id. at 320-21 (Greany, J., concurring) (opining abandonment of public duty rule will prove detrimental
to municipal budgets). It has been suggested that Justice Greaney concurred in the Jean W. opinion because he
felt that action had to be taken to rationalize the state of the law. See Glannon, supra note 24, at 18. Moreover,
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

given the "unsavory alternative" posed by the opinion, he surmised the legislature would respond to the
challenge. See id.
53. Jean W. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305,317 (Mass. 1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting
Massachusetts should not abolish public duty rule).
54. Id. at 319 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (urging court not to abandon public duty rule).
55. /d. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (indicating court should continue to determine when duty of reasonable
care owed).
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C. Legislative Response to the Judiciary: The 1993 Amendment to the Act
In the end, however, both the executive and legislative branches took steps
to address the court's concerns. The Attorney General responded to Jean W. by
drafting an amendment that essentially codified the public duty rule. Although
originally accepting the measure as an outside section of the 1984 budget, the
legislature opted against enacting it at that time. In response, Senator Cheryl
Jacques and Larry Wenglin, counsel to the Senate Judiciary Committee,
convened meetings of a working group to draft an amendment. The group
consisted of representatives from the Attorney General's Office, the Governor's
Office, the Joint Committee on the Judiciary, counsel for several
municipalities, several representatives from the plaintiffs bar, and Suffolk
University Law School Professor Joseph W. G1annon. s6
The drafting committee reasoned that "the balance between liability and
immunity for broad public duties should be struck more or less along the lines
of the Supreme Judicial Court's previous public duty cases."S7 As a result, the
committee focused solely upon Jean W. 's requirement that the statute must
contain "legislative limits on liability for broad public functions, as a substitute
for the public duty rule rejected by the COurt."S8 Beginning with the Attorney
General's draft, the committee refined its scope by narrowing some of the
document's exceptions and clarifying its broad "catch all" exclusion. Although·
this reworking may have narrowed the scope of immunity provided by the
amendment, and thus expanded potential areas of liability, the committee's
utilization of the Attorney General's "protective" bill as a starting point set a
definitive and liability-limiting tone to the drafting process.
Once completed, the committee's bill received support from most of its
members.
Representatives of the plaintiffs bar, however, expressed
displeasure with the breadth of its protection for public employers because the
changes conferred substantial immunity in most public duty situations. In
contrast, had the legislature failed to enact an amendment in response to the
Jean W. decision, the court might have followed through on its threat to remove
all public duty limits on liability. This result would have provided a
tremendous benefit to tort plaintiffs. It is not surprising, then, that "[n]othing
has happened since enactment of the 1993 Amendments that would cause the
plaintiffs bar to change its views."s9 Indeed, plaintiff's counsel in a case
decided after the Act's passage later described the amendment as "manifestly
unfair" and criticized it for putting "an absolute chill on cases against

56.
57.
58.
59.

See Glannon, supra note 24, at 19 (describing fonnation of committee).
See Glannon, supra note 24, at 19.
See Glannon, supra note 24, at 19.
MASS. BAR ASS'N, CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION:

CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 21

HOT TOPICS IN GOVERNMENTAL TORTS AND

(1996).
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municipalities.,,6o
In spite of these criticisms, the legislature enacted Chapter 495 ofthe Acts of
1993. 61 The amendment added six additional exceptions to chapter 258, and
four new "exceptions to the exception." The newly added subsections (e)-(i)
provide governmental immunity from claims based upon the occurrence of five
public functions: licensing, inspection, fire protection, police protection, and
the release or escape of persons in public custody.62 Subsection (j) essentially
serves as a codification of the public duty rule, thus providing general
protection to public employers without limitation to a particular function. 63
Subsections (h) and (j) of the amendment are particularly important to this
analysis.
Subsection (h) of chapter 258 provides immunity against claims based upon
a municipality's "failure to establish a police department or a particular police
service.,,64 If the municipality provides police protection, the statute protects
the entity in the event that such protection proves inadequate, or if the
department fails to detect, prevent, and investigate the commission of a crime. 65
The statute, however, does not provide immunity against claims arising from
"the negligent operation of motor vehicles, negligent protection, supervision or
care of persons in custody, or as otherwise provided in subsection (j)(1).,,66
On its face, subsection (h) exempts from immunity only the negligent
operation of motor vehicles and a police department's negligent protection,
supervision, or care of persons in custody.67 Any other possible avenues for
tort relief with respect to police officers must stem from the exception
contained in subsection (j)(1), discussed below. Notably, subsection (h)
specifically immunizes law enforcement officers from liability based upon their
faiiure to execute an arrest. 68 Prior to the adoption of this amendment, much of
the immunity conferred by this section had been judicially permitted by the
application of the public duty rule. Consequently, the line of cases decided
before the amendment's adoption would likely stand, albeit with one significant
exception. It appears that subsection (h) would have modified or even
abrogated the holding in Irwin v. Town of Ware because the plaintiff in that
case based her claim upon a police department's failure to arrest. As a result of
the amendment, the type of claim at issue in Irwin would have fallen within the

60. See Claire Papanastasiou Rattigan, Town Can't Be Sued for Letting Drunk Driver Go, MAss. LAW.
WKLY., Sept. 19,1994, at27.
61. 1993 Mass. Legis. Servo 495 (West).

62. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(e)-(i) (2002).

63. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § lOCi).
64. See id. § 10(h).
65. [d.
66. MAss. GEN. LAWSch. 258, § 10(h).
67. See id. § 10(h).
68. See id.
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subsection (h) exclusion, thereby conferring immunity upon the officers. 69
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 258 section IOU) immunizes
municipalities against claims originating from an individual's failure to act
towards preventing or diminishing the harmful consequences of a condition or
situation. 7o These situations include "the violent or tortious conduct of a third
person, which is not originally caused by the public employer or any other
person acting on behalf of the public employer.,,71 This catch-all provision is
essentially a "statutory public duty rule" that provides governmental immunity
for an actor's failure to prevent or diminish harm caused by a third party.72
This subsection lends its most general protection to public employers, and, like
subsection (h), embodies the distinction between publicly created risk and the
failure to prevent harm from private or third-party risk. 73 As such, subsection
(i) safeguards a public employee from liability even if he possessed a duty as
part of his public employment to abate or prevent the hazard that injured the
plaintiff. 74
In order to address situations where a victim suffered harm at the hands of a
third party, the amendment provides four exceptions to subsection (i)'s catchall immunity. Immunity is not available if the public employee communicated
a "specific assurance of safety or assistance made to the direct victim or a
member of his family or household by a public employee, beyond general
representations that investigation or assistance will be or has been
undertaken.,,75 The statute requires, however, that the injury must result in part
from reliance on those assurances. 76 The other three exceptions are when the
public employee provides intervention that either worsens matters or itself is
the cause of injury; negligently maintains public property; or negligently
provides medical treatment. 77
The text of subsection (i)(l) holds particular importance in this discussion
because it appears to represent a codification of the common-law special
relationship exception to the public duty rule. 78 As such, this subsection seems

69. See Glannon, supra note 24, at 23-24.
70. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § lOG) (2002).
71. ld.
72. Carleton v. Framingham, 640 N.E.2d 452, 455 (Mass. 1994) (discussing legislative history behind
amendment).
73. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j).
74. See id. § 10. Subsections (h) and (j) fail to provide guidance in situations where a private party causes
the injury but the public employee had some level of involvement in creating or failing to prevent the harm.
See id. § 10(h), (j). In these cases, the critical inquiry is the interpretation of the phrase "not originally caused
by the public employer." ld.
75. ld. § 10(j)(1).

76. ld.
77. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 1O(j)(2)-(4) (2002).
78. See, e.g., A.L. v. Cormnonwealth, 521 N.E.2d 1017, 1027 (Mass. 1988) (holding CormnonweaIth
liable for abuse of students by convicted child molester then employed within school); Irwin v. Town of Ware,
467 N.E.2d 1292, 1299 (Mass. 1984) (ruling town was not irmnune to liability for bystander's death after police
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to offer a ray of hope to citizens who interact individually with public actors,
who then offer assistance and ultimately fail to provide it. Unfortunately, the
language of this provision requires "specific assurance of safety or assistance"
as opposed to "general representations. ,,79 Therefore, the Act prevents courts
from holding public actors liable even in situations where common sense would
find the existence of a special relationship.

D. Judicial Reaction to the 1993 Amendment
1. Section 10(h) in Carleton v. Town of Framingham
Following the legislature's enactment of the amendment, the Supreme
Judicial Court faced a number of cases involving the Massachusetts Tort Claim
Act. One of these cases, Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 80 shared a number
of factual similarities with the Irwin v. Town of Ware. 81 In Carleton, a police
officer encountered an intoxicated driver at a local Dunkin' Donuts. Rather
than immediately take the individual into custody, the officer parked his cruiser
across the street and waited for the intoxicated driver to continue his trip. Once
he did so, the officer pursued the driver with his cruiser lights flashing.
Unfortunately, the officer abandoned pursuit after the intoxicated drive failed to
stop. Later that evening, this driver struck another car after failing to negotiate
a curve and killed all of its passengers.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court issued their decision in Carleton prior to
the amendment's passage, and thus held that the public duty rule did not bar the
plaintiff's recovery.82 The court further concluded that the officer, like the
officer in Irwin, possessed a duty to enforce the statutes regarding intoxicated
operators of motor vehicles. 83 The court further reasoned that the officer could
have anticipated that his "failure to take action to remove a drunk driver from
the highway could result in immediate and foreseeable physical injury to a
failed to detain intoxicated driver).
79. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § lO(j)(l).
80. 640 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1994).
81. See Irwin, 467 N.E.2d at 1292. Prior to the argument phase of the Carleton case, the Massachusetts
Legislature enacted the amendment. Citing the legislature's desire to have the amendment apply to pending
cases and claims, the Supreme Judicial Court invited the parties to file supplemental briefs with respect to the
applicability of the amendment to their case. See generally Bonnie W. v. Commonwealth, 643 N.E.2d 424
(Mass. 1994) (finding Commonwealth not liable for negligent supervision of parolee who attacked plaintiff);
Pallazola v. Town of Foxborough, 640 N.E.2d 460 (Mass. 1994) (holding amendment bars plaintiff's claim
against town for injuries suffered at football game); Rinkaus v. Town of Carver, 637 N.E.2d 229 (Mass. 1994)
(deciding municipality did not owe duty beyond what it owed to public at large); Judson v. Essex Agric. &
Technical Inst., 635 N.E.2d 1172 (Mass. 1994) (holding defendant did not possess a duty to protect plaintiff
from negligence of third parties); Salusti v. Town of Watertown, 635 N.E.2d 249 (Mass. 1994) (concluding
town was not liable for negligent actions of firefighters).
82. See Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 615 N.E.2d 588, 591 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 640 N.E.2d
452 (Mass. 1994).
83. Id.
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member of the public."s4
Following the enactment of the amendment, however, the Supreme Judicial
Court reversed the appeals court by concluding that section lOCh) of the
amended Act "seeks to immunize a municipality when the criminal acts of a
third person are a cause of plaintiffs harm, and the police were negligent in not
preventing that criminal conduct.,,85 The court found each of the Act's
exceptions inapplicable, although it failed to offer any analysis or explanation.
The court declined to consider the applicability of section lO(j), having found
immunity in the language of section I O(h). 86
Nonetheless, the court's opinion revealed signs that it was not entirely
satisfied with the legislature's work in amending the Act. For example, the
majority's opinion suggested the possibility that "the Amendment itself will be
shown to generate its own uncertainties."s7 Chief Justice Liacos commented
directly upon his opinion of the legislature's work, stating that "I may not agree
that the course chosen by the Legislature was the wisest one available.',88
Lastly, the court suggested in a footnote that one could hypothetically argue
that "the Amendment simply makes the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act
inapplicable to claims described in the Amendment, leaving this Court free to
apply common law principles to such claims, unfettered by statutory
governmental immunity considerations.,,89
However interesting it might be to read the tea leaves of footnote six, the
Supreme Judicial Court closes the door it arguably opened in that footnote by
stating that "[i]t appears reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended to
immunize municipalities from liability for those claims described in the
Amendment.,,9o In reaching this conclusion, the court placed substantial
emphasis on the legislature's motives, concluding that they stood for the
"public interest" of protecting the public treasury and "governmental entities
from the expenditure of time, effort, and money in the defense of claims barred
by the Amendment and in protecting against recovery on such claims.'.9l The
court further found that "the Amendment purports to clarify rights and
obligations in an area of the law marked by uncertainty," and deemed this a
"worthy legislative goal.,,92
The fact that the court considered and interpreted legislative intent and

84. ld. at 591-92. The appeals coun provided a detailed description of the officer's testimony, revealing
that the officer knew that the driver was drunk and would be a danger on the road. ld. at 590. In fact, the
officer actually stated to the driver that he hoped he was not driving. ld.
85. Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 640 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Mass. 1994).
86. See id.
87. ld. at 458 (observing coun's criticism of amendment).
88. ld. at 460.
89. Carleton. 640 N.E.2d at 455 n.6.
90. ld. (noting court's interpretation oflegislature's intent).
91. ld. at 458 (revealing coun's strict adherence to legislature's intent).
92. ld.
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motivation is interesting in light of the historical basis for this amendment.
There is no evidence to support a conclusion that the legislature would have
amended the Act of its own volition. It appears logistically clear that the
legislature felt compelled to amend the statute in response to what could be
considered either invitation or threat by the Jean W court. Of course the
legislature was free to respond to the court by taking no action. However, in
light of Justice Greaney's warning of a "deluge of lawsuits" as a result of the
court's decision to abolish the public duty rule, the legislature could have
reasonably concluded that an amendment was both favored and necessary.93
This is, of course, consistent with the Carleton court's interpretation of the
legislative goal of protecting the public purse.
Moreover, the court's opinion that the legislature's attempt "to clarify rights
and obligations in an area of the law marked by uncertainty" was a "worthy
legislative goal" seems to represent a self-serving pat on the back. 94 Recall, it
was the intention of the judiciary that the legislature clarify this area of law.
Thus, whether the legislature had this goal in mind prior to the Jean W
mandate seems simply irrelevant in light of the timing of the amendment.
As a result, the Carleton court's literal, narrow, and perhaps uncreative
interpretation of legislative intent appeared at least partially consistent with the
judiciary's desire to replace the common law public duty doctrine with
statutory language. How much weight, therefore, should the courts give to
legislative intent when the amendment appears to have been motivated by the
judiciary rather than the public? This inquiry seems particularly pertinent in
light of decisions that that the judiciary has rendered since the passage of the
amendment, as well as the tension that still appears to exist between the
judiciary and the legislature regarding this amendment.

2. Section 100) in Brum v. Town of Dartmouth and Lawrence v. City of
Cambridge
In addition to the tension surrounding the court's interpretation of subsection
IO(h), similar problems hamper the viability of subsection lOG). The case of
Brum v. Town of Dartmouth 95 provides a compelling example. In Brum, the
Supreme Judicial Court seemed to look beyond its own common sense and
fairness and reasoned that it had no choice but to engage in a narrow and literal
interpretation of the Act's exception to the public duty rule. 96
The factual circumstances of Brum centered upon two groups of teenagers
who were involved in a fight at Dartmouth High School. 97 Three of the youths
93. Jean w. v. Commonwealth, 610 N.E.2d 305, 320-21 (Mass. 1993) (Greaney, J. concurring).
94. See Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 640 N.E.2d 452,458 (Mass. 1994).
95. 704 N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999).
96. See id. at 1152-55.
97. See Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 690 N.E.2d 844, 846-47 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998), rev'd in part, 704
N.E.2d 1147 (Mass. 1999).
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fled school grounds following the altercation, and one of the students involved
warned the school principal that the three youths had threatened to return and
retaliate. The principal and other school officials then witnessed the three
youths enter the school openly carrying knives, a billy club, a baseball bat, and
a piece of pipe. These officials did not attempt to stop the youths, but instead
allowed them to enter a second-floor classroom where they stabbed and killed
one of the students involved in the fight.
The Appeals Court found that although the words "not originally caused by"
had not been judicially defined, their plain meaning is clear "against the
background" of "the policy that the [Tort Claims] Act is to be construed
liberally for the accomplishment of its remedial purpose, to provide an effective
remedy for persons injured as a result of the negligence of governmental
entities in the Commonwealth." 98 The Court found that the school's
alleged mismanagement of the high school security system by failing to adopt
or implement any security measures created, i.e., originally caused, a condition
or situation of total insecurity against interlopers at the school, the foreseeable
harmful consequences of which . . . the principal and other school officials
wholly failed to prevent or diminish.99

Justice Kass' dissent revealed him to be the prognostic fly on the wall of the
chambers of the Supreme Judicial Court. His dissent warns the Appeals Court
against judicial activism and a liberal statutory interpretation of this legislation.
He chided the majority for employing "convoluted reasoning" in this arena for
its holding that the school authorities originally caused the violent act. IOO
While school officials might have prevented the killing, Justice Kass noted that
the failure to do so does not open them to liability.lol He continued his dissent
by declaring that the majority's
outflanking of the statutory exclusion returns the Court to making the sort of
indefensible distinctions that Jean w.... lamented and that gave rise to the
1993 amendments in the first place. There is nothing obscure about the manner
in which [section] lOCi) is written. The majority opinion is a regrettable

98. See id. at 850-51 (citing MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § IOU) (2002». Section lOCi) immunizes against
any action "based on an act or failure to act to prevent or diminish the harmful consequences of a condition or
situation, including the violent or tortious conduct of third person, which is not originally caused by the public
employer or any other person acting on behalf of the public employer." MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § lOCi)
(2002); see also Irwin v. Town of Ware, 467 N.E.2d 1292, 1307-08 (Mass. 1984) (noting rationale behind Act).
The Brum court based its finding upon the background of rule 12(b)(6) standards, as well as "judicial
recognition that deficient school security can be a causative factor when students at the school are subjected to
physical attack by outsiders." Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 850. The court additionally emphasized the municipality's
obligation to "provide for and enforce school attendance ... and to provide children ... with a safe and secure
environment in which they can learn." [d.
99. See Brum, 690 N.E.2d at 850-51 (noting court's observance of school officials' failure to take
protective measures for student's safety).
100. /d. at 852 (Kass, J., dissenting).
101. See id. (Kass, J., dissenting).
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exercise in judicial nullification of a legislative act. 102
Indeed, the Supreme Judicial Court subsequently reversed the appeals court
and concluded that "there is immunity in respect to all consequences except
where 'the condition or situation' was 'originally caused by the public
employer. ",103 The majority further disagreed with the appeals court's
conclusion that the "not originally caused by" clause did not confer immunity
when a public entity fails to prevent third-party harm, inasmuch as it would
undermine the subsection's purpose. Commending Justice Kass' "pithy
dissent," the court concluded that under the appeals court's interpretation of
IOU), "practically every 'failure to prevent' might be recast in this way as
'originally caus[ing]' a condition, the 'harmful consequences' of which are the
wrongful 'conduct of a third person' and the ensuing harm to the plaintiff, and
the exception would swallow the rule. ,,104
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court again relied upon
legislative intent. Reasoning that Massachusetts lawmakers enacted subsection
IOU) in response to the Jean W. decision, the court observed that the text
reflected an intent to provide government employers with "some substantial
measure of immunity from tort liability.,,105 The court cautioned lower courts
against construing the phrase "not originally caused by" so broadly as to
include remote causation, thereby precluding immunity in almost every
circumstance. 106
After reflecting upon the text of the statute, the court once again criticized
the legislature's work, observing that "to say that § IOU) presents an
interpretive quagmire would be an understatement.,,107 As revealed by the
inconsistent decisions resulting from the judiciary's analysis of this
amendment, the Supreme Judicial Court raised a legitimate concern. Justice
Ireland's concurring opinion leveled a more expansive criticism of the result
compelled by a straightforward interpretation of G.L. c. 258 s IOU). He
concluded with a now-familiar invitation to the legislature. 108
I believe ... that the result in Brum v. [Town oj] Dartmouth is unfortunate.
Although constrained by the words of [chapter 258] ... I believe that the
practical effect of today's ruling is wrong because I think that parents
reasonably should be able to expect that the schools to which they entrust their
children will take reasonable steps to protect their children from harm when, as
here, the school officials are put on notice that the children are or may well be
in jeopardy . . .. This entire matter is within the control of the Legislature,

(Kass, J., dissenting).
103. Brum v. Town of Dartmouth, 704 N.E.2d
104. ld
105. ld at 1154.
106. ld.

102. ld

1147, 1153 (Mass. 1999).

107. Brum, 704 N.E.2d at 1153.
108. ld. at 1162-63 (Ireland, J., concurring) (criticizing result reached in case).
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which, I hope, will act to impose an obligation on school districts, and to ensure
that the restrictions in the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act do not apply to these
109
cases.

Although only two justices joined with Justice Ireland, this issue clearly hit a
nerve within the entire court. In footnote seventeen of the opinion, the court
acknowledged the concurrence's reservations and offered a similar, but less
explicit, invitation to the legislature.
We are in complete sympathy with the concurrence's observations that it is
unfortunate that school officials should escape all legal accountability for their
failure to protect the children under their supervision. As the concurrence
appears to acknowledge, it would, however, distort the general regime of §
lOCi) to interpret its provision, which speaks to tort liability in a wide range of
circumstances, to achieve a satisfactory result in this special category of case.
This is a task for the Legislature. 1\0

Presented with the chance to apply an exception to subsection (j), the
Supreme Judicial Court appeared as reluctant as the Massachusetts Legislature
to act. In Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, III the court encountered its first
opportunity to consider the "exception to the exception" contained in section
1O(j)( 1).112 This case involved a manager of a liquor store who was robbed at
gunpoint in his car after closing the store for the evening. Based upon his
identification of the assailants and the gun, the police eventually arrested the
robbers. Prior to trial, the victim agreed to testify against the assailants if the
police promised to protect him during his store's closing time. The police
fulfilled that obligation for three nights by placing a police officer at the store
during the agreed upon hours. Unfortunately, an officer failed to arrive on the
fourth night and an assailant shot the victim in his back as he entered his car.
When hearing this case, the Supreme Judicial Court did not determine the
ultimate question of liability under subsection (j)(I). Instead, it merely
reversed the lower court's summary judgment decision in favor of the city,
finding that the victim's uncontested allegation that the police promised him
protection when he closed the store raised a genuine issue of fact. ll3
This case is instructive in its interpretation of "explicit" and "specific" in the
context of the Act. The court first looked to Webster's Third International
Dictionary, which defined "explicit" as "characterized by full clear expression;

\09. Id. at 1163 (Ireland, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 1162 n.17.
III. 664 N.E.2d I (Mass. 1996).
112. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 1O(j)(I) (2002). Subsection 10(j)(1) provides that a public employee
may be liable under the Act when he gives a specific assurance of safety or assistance to a victim or members
of her family or household, beyond general representation that investigation or assistance will be or has been
undertaken, when the victim's injury result in part from her reliance upon those assurances. Id.
113. Lawrence, 664 N.E.2d at 3-4. The Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case from the appeals court
on its own initiative.
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being without vagueness or ambiguity; leaving nothing implied.,,114 Turning to
the definition of "specific," the court noted that it meant "characterized by
precise formulation or accurate restriction.,,115 Within the context of section
I OW( 1), the court interpreted the legislature's intention against the definition of
these terms and concluded that "explicit" meant "a spoken or written assurance,
not one implied from the conduct of the parties or the situation.,,116 Using the
same process, the court further concluded that "specific" meant that "the terms
of the assurance must be definite, fixed, and free from ambiguity.,,117
Turning to the facts of the case, the court centered its examination upon the
durational element of the police officer's promise of protection. As a result, the
court reviewed the trial judge's conclusion that the promise lacked sufficient
specificity. In reaching the decision to grant summary judgment for the city,
the trial judge stressed that the store owner "must be taken to know that the
presence would not extend indefinitely" and the officers "made no specific
statement as to duration of the so-called 'protection. ",118 Recall that the single
issue before the court was whether the trial court erred in granting the city
summary judgment. 119 With this in mind, the court did not render a final
determination; rather it simply raised the question of how to interpret the
duration of a promise of protection when the public entity failed to specify a
time frame. 120 Finally, the court carefully closed any doors it might have
suggestively opened by noting that "if the police had withdrawn the promise,
no further reliance on it would be warranted and by the terms of the statute the
city's exposure to liability would cease.,,121
E. The Final Judicial Word: Ford v. Town of Grafton

Given the Appeals Court's decision in Brum, perhaps Catherine Ford and her
attorney had reason to be optimistic. Instead, consistent with the Supreme
Judicial Court's otherwise narrow interpretation of the Act's amendment,
reading the Ford opinion is like watching the climax of an exhaustingly
predictable movie. The facts, too, build to a tragic but unsurprising crescendo,
which the Appeals Court spells out in a detailed, powerfully narrative

114.
liS.
116.
117.

ld. at 3 n.5 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONALDICTJONARY 801 (3d ed. 1993».
!d. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTJONARY 2187 (3d ed. 1993».
!d. at 3.
See Lawrence v. City of Cambridge, 664 N.E.2d 1,3 (Mass. 1996) (interpreting legislature's intended
meaning of key words).
118. ld. at 4.
119. ld. at 1.
120. See id. at 4 (declaring plaintiff's unopposed allegation against police department raised genuine issue
of material fact). Emphasizing that the plaintiff's affidavit stood unchallenged, the court acknowledged that his
"assertions must be taken as true, and the credibility of the plaintiff'S statements is an issue for the trier offact."
Id.

121. Lawrence, 664 N.E.2d at 4-5.
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On October 18, 1984, Catherine Ford obtained a temporary protective order
against her husband, James Davidson, pursuant to chapter 209A. The court
subsequently extended it until October 25, 1985. The protective order required
James to stay away from Catherine's residence, restrained him from harassing
her at her workplace, and prohibited him from abusing her or imposing any
restraint on her personal liberty. Catherine took her restraining order to the
Grafton police station to be logged and posted. 123
In addition, Catherine visited a Grafton police officer at his home and sought
his advice on how to deal with her husband. The officer, however, told
Catherine that "the situation with her husband was her problem" and that "the
police could not babysit her twenty-four hours a day.,,124 Ultimately, he
advised her to "buy a gun because the only way to deal with violence [is
through] violence.,,125
Four days later, James attacked Catherine as she left work.
The
Northborough police arrived and told Catherine that they would not arrest
James for violating the restraining order because they had not yet served him
with it. The police subsequently served James at the scene and then allowed
him to leave.
Following this incident, Catherine went to the Grafton Police Department to
file a report. While at the station, an official informed her that they could take
no action because the attack had occurred in another town. Less than an hour
later, James traveled to Catherine's parents' home and threatened to kill
Catherine ifher family refused to allow him to see or speak to her. Catherine's
sister immediately reported this encounter to the Grafton police who responded
by taking the intoxicated James into protective custody as "an incapacitated
person.,,126 The responding officer did not speak to Catherine or any member
of her family concerning James' threats, and released him from custody on the
following morning. 127
On the twentieth of November, Catherine informed the Grafton Police that
James was driving an eighteen-wheel truck around her home, looking into her
windows while apparently intoxicated. Catherine reminded the police of her
valid restraining order. An officer responded that they could not act unless the
police observed him at her home. The Grafton police then contacted both the
Millbury and Shrewsbury police and requested that they check on whether

122. See generally Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
123. See id. at 1049 (detailing events surrounding issuance of court order). Catherine also gave the
protective order reflecting the extension to the Grafton police. Id. The police were aware of its provisions, but
the order was not properly reflected in the department's logs. Id.
124. See id.
125. See id. (relaying officer's attitude and advice).
126. See Ford, 643 N.E.2d at 1049.
127. See id. (explaining James' arrest and subsequent release).
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James possessed a valid driver's license. The Grafton police, however, did not
request that either police department detain James for violating the protective
order. The Millbury police eventually stopped James and, after determining
that he was not driving under the influence of alcohol, allowed him to proceed
on his way. The officer then relayed a summary of his encounter to the Grafton
police.
Four days later, Catherine's sister reported to the police that James had
called her home repeatedly and threatened to kidnap her children unless she
allowed him to speak with Catherine. A Grafton officer patrolled the area
surrounding the home, but opted against making any attempt to locate James.
The following day, Catherine and the Grafton police received a call from
James' treating psychiatrist, informing them that James had threatened to kill
Catherine. Catherine immediately contacted the Grafton police. In their reply,
the police informed Catherine there was nothing that they could do about the
situation, and merely recorded the incident by making a notation in their police
log.
On January 10, 1985, after a clerk's hearing regarding a criminal complaint
that Catherine had filed against James, James again threatened to kill Catherine.
Upon hearing this, Catherine and her sister drove directly to their parents'
home where they received a phone call from James threatening to come over if
he was not permitted to speak with Catherine. While her sister contacted the
police, Catherine attempted to hide because James subsequently arrived at the
premises and remained outside their door. During her call to the police,
Catherine's sister once again reminded them of Catherine's current restraining
order. When two officers finally responded, they spoke only to James, advised
him on how to retrieve his belongings from inside the home, walked him off of
the property, and allowed him to drive away.
Less than a month later, Catherine informed the Grafton police that she
believed James was trying to purchase a gun. The police logged the call but
took no further action. The following day, Catherine's sister informed the
police that James had arrived at her home and had rummaged through her
mailbox. The police recorded the call, instructed her to contact the post office,
and, predictably at this point, refused to take further action.
Catherine ultimately divorced James in March of that year and agreed not to
pursue a criminal complaint for assault and battery arising out of the incident
that had taken place at her workplace. Apparently, Catherine made this
decision due to her fear of James as well as his promise that he would move out
of the area. This promise held substantial weight, given that James provided
her with a letter from his employer verifying an out of state job offer.
In late April, a Grafton police officer arrived at Catherine's home after
receiving a complaint that James had entered Catherine's backyard through her
neighbor's property. James had already left the property by the time that the
officer eventually arrived. The officer then contacted the police department in
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James' hometown of Millbury, and requested that they order him to report to
the Grafton police station. James complied and subsequently admitted to the
Grafton police that he had violated Catherine's restraining order by entering the
grounds of her residence. The officer told James that he was "tired of [James]
upsetting [Catherine]" and that if he "bothered her in the future, [he] would do
his best to get him into COurt.,,128 The officer did not arrest James for violating
the restraining order, but instead told him that he would be summonsed to court
for the violation. 129
In addition to obtaining a restraining order and seeking assistance from the
police, Catherine took independent steps in her attempt to protect herself from
James. First, she changed departments at work and requested her employer to
inform James that she no longer worked there. Catherine also stopped driving
and, except for purposes of traveling to and from work, ceased to travel in cars
altogether. After enduring this situation for a year, Catherine began to
periodically drive her car in October of 1985. Later that month, while stopped
at a traffic light, James suddenly appeared and began pounding on her car.
Shaken, Catherine immediately reported the incident to the Grafton police, who
once again informed her there was nothing they could do.
Catherine allowed the protective order to expire on the twenty-fifth of
October. Reflecting upon the events that had transpired, Catherine realized that
she had not dared to live outside the protection of her sister's family for over a
year. In addition to her own well-being, Catherine began to fear for the safety
of her sister's family. With these concerns planted firmly within her mind,
Catherine resolved to move out of the state in order to protect herself and those
she cared about from James.
Just two weeks into the new year, James threatened Catherine's life again.
Once more, Catherine contacted the Grafton police and reported the incident.
In the early evening of January 17, 1986, while Catherine worked in her
kitchen preparing dinner, she heard someone at the door and assumed it was her
sister. To her surprise, she found James, who then forced his way into her
home. Catherine immediately ran out the front door, with James closely
following behind her. During her flight, Catherine sprinted in front of a
moving car and was hit. Injured, she hurried to a neighbor's house and
pounded on the door, but no one let her in. As she ran to the next house, James
caught up to her and said, "Where do you want it? You bitch, you're going to
die.,,130 James then shot Catherine three times in the face and neck, rendering

128. Id. at 105!.
129. Id. The court summonsed James on September 19, 1985, some five months after the incident. Id.
The prosecutor was provided with no information about the parties' history, nor was Catherine notified of the
prosecution, made aware of any court dates, or summonsed as a witness. Id. Catherine learned that the court
fined James for the violation by reading about the court proceeding in a newspaper. Id.
130. Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 10SI (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (detailing confrontation
between James and Catherine).
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her a quadriplegic. Afterwards, James fatally shot himself.
On July 2,1987, Catherine filed suit against the Town of Grafton as a result
of the shooting, claiming, among other things, that the town was liable under
the Massachusetts Tort Claims ACt. 131 After examining the evidence, the trial
court ruled that sections IO(h) and IOU) of chapter 258 conferred immunity
upon the Town of Grafton. 132
On appeal, Catherine argued that sections lOCh) and IOU) did not preclude
her claim for numerous reasons. First, she contended that the town directly
assured her that she was receiving all of the protection available to her under
chapter 209A, and she was injured as a result. 133 Furthermore, Catherine
stressed that the town's intervention in her situation caused her injury or
enhanced her vulnerability to James' threats. 134 Lastly, she contended that
chapter 209A provided her with a claim under the savings clause of chapter 258
section 10. 135
After weighing Catherine's arguments, the appeals court first engaged in a
traditional tort analysis, finding "[t]he evidence, taken in the light most
favorable to [Catherine], establishes that the town failed repeatedly to arrest
[James] despite its obligation to do so under G.L. c. 209A.,,136 The court
reasoned that "the town's negligence reasonably could be inferred from the
evidence.,,137 In spite of this conclusion, the court proceeded to deny liability
on the part of the town. The appeals court interpreted the language of
subsection IO(h) as the legislature's "explicit choice to immunize the town in
the circumstances ofthis case," thus binding the court to rule accordingly. 138
Catherine had argued that subsection I O(j)( I) applied because the town
directly assured her that she was receiving all of the her entitled protections
under chapter 209A, and that she suffered injury as a result of her reliance upon
those assurances. She also argued that "the act of the Legislature in enacting
G.L. c. 209A-a statute of general applicability-and the act of the court in
issuing her a protective order constitute an assurance of safety or assistance by
individuals in the town's police department.,,139 In other words, Catherine
argued that she received both direct, explicit assurance from the Grafton police,
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 1051-52.
See id. at 1053.
Id.
See Ford, 693 N.E.2d at 1054.
See id. at 1054.
Id. (communicating analysis of court).

at 1053.
Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998). The court then stressed that
the town's "alleged negligent intervention is based on its failure to investigate, detect crime, apprehend, arrest,
and enforce the law." Id. It noted that the "intervention is not based on collateral negligence in the course of
anyone of these police functions" and that Catherine's claim fell "within the sec. lOCh) exclusion for police
protection activities." Id. Lastly, the court acknowledged that it was "bound to consider only the specific
limitations to this exclusion enumerated by the Legislature." Id.
139. See Ford, 693 N.E.2d at 1054.
Id.
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as well as a statutory assurance arising from her receipt of a restraining order
under chapter 209A.
The court rejected Catherine's argument that the police provided her with
explicit and specific assurances. It arrived at this conclusion by relying upon
the Lawrence interpretation of "explicit" and "specific," and thus determined
that the assurances provided by the town were neither explicit nor specific. 14o
According to the court, the town merely communicated to Catherine that it
could not take any action until it either witnessed James violating the order or
causing Catherine harm. 141 In support of its holding, the court noted that the
police actually informed Catherine that they were not her "babysitting service"
and advised her to purchase a gun for protection. 142 As a result, the court
declared that "the evidence precludes a finding that the town gave 'explicit and
specific assurances of safety or assistance' to [Catherine] or her family.,,143
The court, however, failed to address Catherine's assertion that she had
received statutory assurance arising from chapter 209A and her receipt of the
restraining order.l44
The court's opinion did not discuss the common-law concept of special
relationship within the context of the Act, although the statutory analysis
suggested that recipients of protective orders do not fall into this category in
such a way that would exempt the police from immunity. The court's rejection
of Catherine's procedural due process claim seemed further instructive, as it
explicitly stated that "[no] Massachusetts Court has determined that a
protective order creates a special relationship between the police and a
domestic violence victim.,,145
Finally, Catherine argued that chapter 209A justified a claim against the
town pursuant to the "savings clause" of chapter 258 section 10. The clause
states that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed to modify or repeal the
applicability of any existing statute that limits, controls or affects the liability of
public employers or entities.,,146 Consequently, she contended that the town's
disregard of chapter 209A's arrest requirement rendered the municipality liable
as a matter of law. The appeals court rejected this argument as well. In doing
so, the court agreed that the statute mandates police officers to act in
accordance with the statute but concluded that there is "no language in the

140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. See Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 1054 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
144. See id. at 1047. Catherine further argued that the town was not entitled to immunity pursuant to the
second exception, section 1O(j)(2), because "the town's intervention caused injury or enhanced her
vulnerability to [James'] threats." Id. at 1054. The court refused to consider this argument. /d.
145. Id. at 1055; see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (discussing impact of DeShaney on due
process claims similar Catherine's cause of action).
146. Ford, 693 N.E.2d at 1053 (discussing particular aspects of Catherine's argument).
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statute that holds officers liable for failing to do SO.,,147
The Ford decision demonstrates that now that the dust has settled on the Act
and its various amendments and interpretations, victims of domestic violence
like Catherine Ford "have lost a claim against the less culpable wrongdoer, the
entity that could have, but did not prevent [the third party] from committing the
tortS.,,148 Furthermore, the decision sends a message to the police that the very
worst thing they can do is promise a victim of domestic violence that they will
protect them within the statutory requirements of chapter 209A. Instead, the
court's holding encourages police to violate their statutory obligation to offer
help, and thus avoid any liability that may attach to any such offer.
II. MASSACHUSETTS' RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

The Ford court's refusal to find that Catherine Ford had a claim against the
Town of Grafton on these grounds marks a clear departure from the judiciary's
consistent efforts to effectuate the legislature's intent for domestic violence
victims to receive special protection from government. The legislature has
demonstrated its commitment to assist and protect domestic violence victims in
a multitude of ways. Indeed, as we demonstrate below, Massachusetts stands
as one of the most forward-thinking and proactive states in terms of providing
protection for victims of domestic violence and their families.
In this section, we describe Massachusetts' domestic violence legislation,
focusing on chapter 209A's mandatory arrest provisions. We then examine
various examples of executive action and legislative and judicial cooperation,
all of which illustrate the state's commitment to protect victims of domestic
violence. 149 This section declares that, in light of the evidence of the
legislature's commitment, any court could reasonably conclude that
Massachusetts lawmakers sought to hold the police liable for failing to enforce
a restraining order in circumstances similar to those endured by Catherine Ford.
The Ford court's failure to reach this conclusion reveals a judiciary that
remains confused by the current state of the immunity law. At the very least,

147. See id. at 1054-55 (conducting textual examination of statute to detennine existence of liability).
148. Carleton v. Town of Framingham, 640 N.E.2d 452, 458 (Mass. 1994). See generally Ford, 693
N.E.2d 1047. Since the Ford holding, the Massachusetts judiciary has decided only one other case dealing with
liability for failure to enforce restraining orders. This case, however, failed to proceed past the trial level. See
McClure v. Town of East Brookfield, No. 972004B, 1999 WL 1323628, at *1 (Mass. Super. Mar. II, 1999). In
McClure, the plaintiff brought suit against the Town of East Brookfield under the Tort Claims Act and chapter
209A, for the police's failure to protect her and her children from physical and mental abuse by their father,
Thomas McClure. Id. at * I. The trial court reasoned that the decisions in Ford and Brum had precluded the
judiciary from imposing "liability upon a municipality under the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act (G.L. c. 258)
for an alleged failure to defend." Id. at *5. As a result, the court granted the town's motion for summary
judgment. Id.
149. For more infonnation regarding domestic violence initiatives, as well as applicable cases and laws not
covered in this article, see the Massachusetts Coalition Against Domestic Violence website at http://www.
janedoe.org/.
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the court's failure demonstrates that the legislature must act to clarify the
underlying causes of this confusion.

A. Legislative Response
The Massachusetts Legislature first demonstrated its commitment to
protecting victims of domestic violence in 1978 when it became the second
state government to enact a statute that created domestic violence restraining
orders. 15o Massachusetts' Abuse Prevention Act, which is commonly referred
to simply as chapter 209A, is considered one of the most comprehensive and
far-reaching domestic violence laws in the United States because it
encompasses both criminal and civil law issues.
In the absence of any legislative history, the Supreme Judicial Court has
interpreted the text to provide a "mechanism by which victims of family or
household abuse can enlist the aid of the State to prevent further abuse.,,151 The
court expanded upon the legislative intent behind the statute by declaring that it
represented a "response to the troubling social problem of family and
household abuse in the Commonwealth.,,152 In the court's eyes, judicial orders
issued pursuant to chapter 209A "afford abused individuals the opportunity to
avoid further abuse and to provide them with assistance in structuring some of
the basic aspects of their lives, such as economic support and custody of minor
children, in accordance with their right not to be abused.,,153
This legislation ultimately created a program that has served as a domestic
abuse prevention model for the rest of the country. The statute calls for
coordination and cooperation among various parties involved in domestic
violence incidents including judges, district attorneys, police and social service
agencies. 154 Such coordination streamlines the restraining order process by,
among other things, creating a domestic violence clerk position to work
exclusively on processing restraining orders within the court system. 155 The
program also involves stringent monitoring and enforcement of probation for
aggressors, coupled with a proactive response from the District Attorney's

150. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6 (2002) (providing domestic abuse protection). Pennsylvania
became the first state to enact statutorily-based domestic relations restraining orders. See PA. CONS. STAT. §§
6101-6118 (1996) (codifying and amending 1975 statutes); see also Sally Engle Merry, Rights. Religion and
Community: Approaches to Violence Against Women in the Context o/Globalization. 35 LAW & SOC'y REv.
39,50 (2001) (identifying Pennsylvania and Massachusetts as first two states to adopt restraining order laws).
151. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 553 N.E.2d 915, 917 (Mass. 1990) (reflecting upon purpose of
statute).
152. Id. at 918.
153. Id.
154. See Betsy Tsai, Note, The Trend Toward Specialized Domestic Violence Courts: Improvements on an
Effective Innovation, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1285, 1298 (2000) (explaining coordinated approach for addressing
domestic abuse in Massachusetts).
155. See id. (illustrating function of domestic violence clerk).
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Office. 156 The statute not only provides victims with immediate relief, but also
possesses a capacity to address their long-term needs. 157 The definition of
abuse is broad and the statute provides expansive coverage to individuals who
suffer from it. The text of chapter 209A also grants courts a substantial
measure of discretion when determining proper jurisdiction and venue. ISS
Furthermore, chapter 209A section 6 clearly reveals the legislature's intent
to confer a great deal of authority and responsibility upon law enforcement
officials to assist and protect victims and restrain perpetrators. 159 Amended in
1983, section 6 states that "[w]henever any law officer has reason to believe
that a family or household member has been abused or is in danger of being
abused, such officer shall use all reasonable means to prevent further abuse.,,16o
As a result, police officers possess a duty to assist those who have been abused,
as well as those who are in danger of suffering abuse.
With respect to victim assistance, section 6 requires that an officer who
believes abuse has occurred "shall take, but not be limited to the following
action:" remain inside the alleged victim's dwelling after reporting to the scene
of the incident; assist the victim in obtaining medical assistance if needed;
provide the victim with a detailed explanation of her rights under
Massachusetts law; help the victim locate and travel to a safe place; activate the
emergency judicial system after court hours, if necessary; inform the victim
that the perpetrator will be eligible for bail and may be promptly released. 161
The original statute also added to the list of "reasonable means" that police
officers must employ to prevent further abuse warrantless arrest of any
individual in the following circumstances: (1) probable cause to believe that
individual has committed a felony; (2) commits a misdemeanor that involves
abuse within the officer's presence; (3) has probable cause to believe that an
individual has violated a temporary restraining or vacate order; and (4) if the
officer has probable cause to believe that the individual has committed an

156. See id.; see also Katherine Triantafillou, Massachusetts: New Legislation to Help Battered Women.
27 JUDGE'S J. 20, 22-23 (1988) (describing Abuse Prevention Act as effective response to domestic violence in
Massachusetts).
157. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 3 (2002). Section 3 provides broad and comprehensive relief to
domestic violence victims. First, it orders the defendant to refrain from abusing or contacting the plaintiff. /d.
§ 3(a)-(b). It also prohibits the defendant from approaching the plaintiff's workplace and requires him to
vacate the household. Id. § 3(c). In addition, the statute requires the defendant to pay temporary child support,
financially compensate the plaintiff for losses suffered as a result of the abuse, and refrain from contacting the
minor child. Id. § 3(e)-(f), (h). The statute further empowers courts to award the plaintiff temporary custody of
a minor child, to order a defendant to attend a certified batterer's intervention program, and to impound
information in the case record. /d. § 3(d), (g), (i).
158. Id. § 3(i).
159. See id. § 6; see also Triantafillou, supra note 156, at 51 (identifying section of Abuse Prevention Act
regarding police duties as most important clause for preventing domestic abuse practice).
160. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6.
161. Id.
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assault and battery that involved abuse. 162
The 1990 amendment to this section strengthened the statute's mandatory
arrest language with regard to perpetrators whom law enforcement has probable
cause to believe have violated a restraining order. The amendment declares
that "when there are no vacate, restraining or no-contract orders or judgment in
effect, arrest shall be the preferred response.,,163 The amendments also
explicitly deemed the safety of the victim and children a "paramount"
consideration of police officers when deciding whether or not to arrest an
alleged perpetrator. 164
These amendments have expanded police power to make mandatory
warrantless arrests for specified misdemeanors in the context of domestic
violence. This expansion of power is significant because, under common law,
warrantless arrests for a misdemeanor involving a breach of the peace are not
permitted unless the misdemeanor is committed in a police officer's presence
and continues at time of the arrest. The legislature's decision to enlarge the
power to arrest demonstrates its intent that the police playa significant role in
assisting victims and restraining perpetrators of domestic violence. 165
B. Executive and Judicial Response

Action to address the problem of domestic violence was not, however,
confined to the legislature. Immediately following the passage of chapter
209 A, the Attorney General sponsored a statewide conference that included
chief justices, police chiefs and district attorneys. In addition, the Consumer
Protection Bureau produced a "rights card" and, following the conference, trial
judges and district attorneys attended additional lectures. Moreover, the Chief
Justices of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court and the District Court
promulgated compliance memos, and the Police Chiefs Association met with
advocates to create a compliance handbook for training purposes. 166 Following
the conference, the Administrative Office of the Massachusetts Trial Court
issued the Guidelines for Judicial Practice. 167 These guidelines were designed
to assist judges and court personnel address issues that often arose in chapter
209 A proceedings. The Administrative Office described the guidelines as a
tool for promoting the safety of chapter 209A applicants and ensuring the due

162. Id. § 6(4}, (7).
163. !d.
164. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6(7}(c} (2002).
165. See TriantafilJou, supra note 156, at 51 (explaining legislative intent vis-ii-vis police powers under
Abuse Protection Act).
166. See Triantafillou, supra note 156, at 51-52.
167. ADMINISTRATNE OFFICE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL COURT, GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL
PRACTICE: ABUSE PREVENTION PROCEEDINGS (Dec. 28, 2000), available at http://www.mass.gov/Courts/
formsandguidel ines/domestic/dvg l.html.
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process rights of corresponding defendants. 168 .
Despite these initial efforts, Governor William Weld recognized that
domestic violence victims continued to lack much-needed protections. In
response, the Massachusetts governor declared domestic violence a public
health emergency in September of 1992.
Subsequently, the governor
established a Registry of Civil Restraining Orders, the nation's first statewide,
computerized domestic violence record-keeping system. 169 The registry
features a centralized database that is accessible by judicial officials and law
enforcement personnel for the purposes of issuing and enforcing abuse
prevention orders in a more effective manner. 170
Various state agencies have implemented these systems into their mission
protocol for preventing domestic violence. For example, the Massachusetts
Department of Social Services (DSS) has employed domestic violence
specialists in their statewide offices and created a groundbreaking integration
model that incorporated domestic violence expertise into their child protective
services. l7l These specialists work side-by-side with child protection case
workers and provide case consultation, direct advocacy, and connections to
community resources for victims and their children. DSS policy supports
decision-making within the agency that is responsive to the concerns of
battered women. Such concerns generally include screening, investigation, risk
assessment, family assessment, case planning and other related services.172
The Massachusetts Office for Victim Assistance (MOV A) has pioneered an
equally advanced program called SAFEPLAN. 173 The creation of SAFEPLAN
resulted from a partnership between MOV A and community-based domestic
violence programs, as well as through collaborations with district attorneys'
offices, criminal justice and social services agencies, and legal services
programs. SAFEPLAN advocates are trained and certified to provide legal
168. Barbara A. Dortch-Okara, Forward to ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE MASSACHUSETTS TRIAL
COURT, GUIDELINES FOR JUDICIAL PRACTICE: ABUSE PREVENTION PROCEEDINGS (Dec. 28, 2000), available at
http://www.mass.gov/Courts/formsandguidelines/domestic/foreward.html.
169. Toni Locy, Weld Signs Bill Creating Registry ofBatterers, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 23,1992, at BIO.
170. SANDRA ADAMS & ANNE POWELL, OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER OF PROBATION, TRAGEDIES OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF CIVIL RESTRAINING ORDERS IN MASSACHUSETTS 22
(1995). The statute that amended section 7 requires judges to search a defendant's record for instances of past
civil or criminal domestic abuse. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 7 (2002). If an outstanding warrant exists
against the defendant and the defendant is found to pose a risk of injury to the plaintiff, the judge is also
required to notify police as to the outstanding warrant. ld. The police officer will then "take all necessary
actions to execute any such outstanding warrant as soon as is practicable." ld.
171. See Massachusetts Health and Human Services, Help for Battered Women on Public Assistance, at
http://www.mass.gov(lastvisitedMar.11 ,2005).
172. See Linda Spears, Building Bridges Between Domestic Violence Organizations and Child Protective
Services, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ONLINE RESOURCES (Feb. 2000), at http://www.vaw.umn.edul
docurnents/dvcps/dvcps.html.
173. See Massachusetts Office of Victim Assistance (MOVA), About SAFEPLAN, at http://www.mass.
gov/mova/page85.html (last visited Feb. 25. 2005). SAFEPLAN stands for Safety Assistance For Every Person
Leaving Abuse Now. See id.
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advocacy and supportive services to victims who seek judicial intervention
primarily through chapter 209A applications. I74 These advocates are based in
thirty-six district and probate courts, and provide their services throughout the
state.
Beyond these initiatives, the Weld Administration established the
Governor's Commission on Domestic Violence. Governor Weld charged this
advisory committee with the task of formulating innovative and coordinated
policies that addressed the state's domestic violence problem.
The
commission's appointed members included various state secretaries who have
continued to rely upon input from the courts, the Office of Probation, the Parole
Board, the District Attorneys' offices, local state police departments, the
Massachusetts Coalition of Battered Women's Service Groups, and state
certified batterer's intervention programs. Among its other accomplishments,
the committee helped create the first statewide Domestic Violence Law
Enforcement Guidelines and modified the statewide certification standards for
batterer intervention programs. 175
C. Legislative and Judicial Cooperation

Recognizing that it could not conclude its efforts to provide assistance and
protection to domestic violence victims with the enactment of chapter 209A,
the legislature enacted criminal legislation designed to support then-existing
civil domestic violence statutes. The so-called "Dangerousness Statute,"
permits the Commonwealth to request an order of pretrial detention or release
on conditions for felony offenses involving the use of force. 176 If, after the
hearing, a court determines by clear and convincing evidence that any condition
of release would fail to reasonably assure the safety of any person or the
community, the court must detain the defendant without bail.177 This
legislation helps victims of domestic violence by ensuring that their batterers'
violent history will be relevant for preventing certain conditions of release.
Since the enactment of such statutes, both the legislature and the judiciary
have addressed the impact of domestic violence on child custody and visitation.
In 1996, the Supreme Judicial Court held in Custody of Vaughn178 that courts
must consider the impact of domestic violence on children when making

174. See MOV A, supra note 173. Advocates conduct risk and needs assessments, inform victims of their
legal rights and options in civil and criminal proceedings, and assist them with 209A paperwork. Id. In
addition, SAFEPLAN advocates help victims understand current domestic violence laws and assist them
throughout the process of obtaining a restraining order. Id. Lastly, advocates work with each victim to develop
a safety plans, provide resource referrals, and advocate for the victim during her 209A proceedings. Id.
175. See Governor's Commission on Domestic Violence, History of the Commission (2002), available at
http://www.mass.gov/gcdv/comm.htrn.
176. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 58A(l) (2002).
177. See id. § 58A(3) (requiring mandatory detention when safety of community not assured).
178. 664 N.E.2d 434 (Mass. 1996).

HeinOnline -- 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 585 2004-2005

586

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII:557

custody determinations. 179 Furthermore, the opinion required judges to make
findings of fact that reflect their consideration of this issue. 180 The judicial
mandate of Vaughn broadened the statutory requirement that courts must
consider domestic violence in custody decisions. 181 As a result of this
expansion, the Massachusetts judiciary became the first in the nation to require
judges to consider domestic violence during custody determinations and to
memorialize that consideration in written findings. In a beautiful example of
judicial and legislative cooperation, the legislature subsequently codified this
requirement and took the decision a step further by amending the custody
statute to create a rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a
· parent. 182
battenng
D. Ford v. Grafton

The preceding sections demonstrate that, at the time of the Ford decision,
Massachusetts had both a legislative scheme and a judiciary that strongly
supported efforts to protect victims of domestic violence. Indeed, the Ford
court explicitly revealed the ways in which Catherine Ford's situation fell
within the previously described legislative and judicial scheme. The court
noted that "the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
establishes that the town failed repeatedly to arrest [James] despite its
obligation to do so under G.L. c. 209A.,,183 The obligation that the court
referred to was the mandatory arrest provision contained in section seven of the
statute. This observation holds particular significance because section seven
became effective in 1990, well after the time period during which Catherine
had a restraining order. Nonetheless, the appeals court still found that the
Grafton police held a statutory obligation to arrest James. 184
The court agreed that the legislature intended for Catherine to be protected,
and that the police had violated their statutory duty by failing to take sufficient
action. With this established, however, the court refused to impose liability for
that violation. This decision signified a departure from the judiciary's prior
efforts to effectuate the legislature's intent to provide as much protection as
possible for victims of domestic violence. This dramatic shift can be explained
only in light of the confusing and painful parallel history described in the
previous section. When read in that context, the Ford opinion reads much like
a plea for clarification. Such assistance will then allow the court to resume its
179. See id. at 439-40 (emphasizing impact of domestic violence on children).
180. See id. at 439 (affirming R.H. v. B.F., 653 N.E.2d 195 (Mass. 1995)).
181. See generally Philip C. Crosby, Case Comment, Custody of Vaughn: Emphasizing the Importance of
Domestic Violence in Child Custody Cases, 77 B.U. L. REv. 483 (1997) (noting significance of Vaughn as a
divergence from holdings in other state jurisdictions).
182. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31A (2002); MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § \O(e).
183. Ford v. Town ofGrafion, 693 N.E.2d 1047,1052 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
184. See id. (identifying police's obligation to arrest under chapter 209A).
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partnership with the legislature in the fight against domestic violence.
III. ASSESSING LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO ENFORCE RESTRAINING ORDERS

This plea for clarification becomes even more evident when considering that
courts around the country-in jurisdictions with substantially similar
governmental immunity and domestic violence statutes-have found ways to
hold police departments liable for failing to enforce restraining orders. This
section examines six such cases within the context of the arguments posed by
Catherine Ford. This section ultimately concludes that the appeals court could
have found the Town of Grafton liable for exactly the reasons Catherine Ford
argued: the "savings clause" of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act provides
relief from the police claim of immunity, and the existence of domestic
violence laws created a special relationship between Catherine Ford and the
police that rendered the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act inapplicable. 185

A. Savings Clause
While remaIning consistent with the existing Massachusetts statutory
scheme of domestic violence and governmental immunity, as well as with case
law around the country, the court could have held that the Town of Grafton
lacked immunity from liability under the Act's savings clause. As discussed,
the Act provides immunity to police officers for failure to arrest, even if such
failure was in fact negligent. 186 The Act's savings clause states simply that no
provision in the immunity statute should conflict with existing laws. 187 The
pertinent existing law in this inquiry is the restraining order law of chapter
209 A, which specifically requires police officers to execute arrests when they
have probable cause to believe that the law has been violated. 188
Catherine Ford argued, therefore, that the police department's repeated
failure to arrest James represented a violation of state law. Specifically, she
contended that the mandatory arrest requirement of chapter 209A rendered the
town of Grafton liable as a matter of law. To this claim the court simply
responded: "We agree that M.G.L. 209A mandates police officers to act in
accordance with the statute. However, we find no language in the statute that
holds officers liable for failing to do SO.,,189
While perhaps understandable in light of the ongoing tension between the

185. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 1O(h). Section 10 declares that none ofits parts "shall be construed to
modify or repeal the applicability of any existing statute that limits, controls or affects the liability of public
employees or entities." ld. § 1O(j)(3).
186. ld. § 1O(h). Section 10(h) provides immunity against any claim based upon the failure to arrest or
detain suspects. !d.
187. ld.
188. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209, § 6 (2002).
189. Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 1054-55 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
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judicial and legislative branches described in Part I, this holding did not stand
as the court's only recourse. In a very similar case in New Jersey, a trial court
ruled that the state's savings clause denied the police immunity for failing to
arrest someone whom they had probable cause to believe had violated a
restraining order. 190
The New Jersey court based its decision upon facts that closely resembled
the circumstances of the Ford case. In this case, police officers from the Town
o'r Plainfield, New Jersey responded to a complaint made by the plaintiff,
Joanne Campbell, informing them that her estranged husband, Michael, arrived
at her home. When the police arrived on the scene, they ordered Michael to
leave and then remained on the premises until his departure. While the police
were still there, Joanne mentioned to them that she had a valid restraining order
against Michael that prohibited him from having any contact with her. The
police, despite knowledge of the restraining order and notice of previous
incidents of domestic violence at Joanne's residence, failed to arrest Michael
for this violation. 191 Michael returned "a short time later" and shot Joanne. 192
Like Catherine Ford, Joanne Campbell brought an action alleging that the
police officers were negligent for failing to arrest Michael. She further argued
that the police officers' decision not to arrest Michael violated the New Jersey
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act. Similar to Massachusetts law, the
language of the New Jersey statute requires that an officer who responds to a
domestic violence incident and "finds probable cause to believe that domestic
violence has occurred ... shall arrest the person who is alleged to be the person
who subjected the victim to domestic violence.,,193
The Town of Plainfield moved for summary judgment, claiming that the
police were not negligent. The town additionally contended that, even if the
officers were negligent, they received immunity from the New Jersey Tort
Claims Act. Like its Massachusetts counterpart, the New Jersey statute
provides that "neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for injury
caused by the failure to make an arrest or by the failure to retain an arrested
person in custody.,,194
190. See Campbell v. Campbell, 682 A.2d 272, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
191. !d. at 273.
192. Id.
193. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-21 (West 1995).
194. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59:5-4 (West 1992). The chapter titled Immunity and Liability of a Public Entity,
states that "(a) public entity is liable for injury proximately caused by an act or omission of a public employee
within the scope of his employment in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances." ld. § 59:2-2. Although "[a] public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the
exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity." ld. § 59:2-3. The statute also states that "[a] public
entity is not liable for any injury caused by adopting or failing to adopt a law or failing to enforce a law." ld. §
59:2-4.
The Correctional Facilities and Police Activities chapter of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act also
specifically deals with liability of police officers. Immunity from liability is provided "for failure to provide
police protection service, or if police protection service is provided, for failure to provide sufficient police
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The New Jersey Superior Court, however, did not accept the town's
argument. Noting that the New Jersey Tort Claims Act "appears to be in direct
conflict" with the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act's mandatory arrest
requirement, the court held that the police were not immune from liability.195
The court relied on what it described as the legislature's clear mandate that "a
police officer must enforce a domestic violence order and all other laws which
protect domestic violence victims."I96 In addition, the court cited the
Prevention of Domestic Violence Act for its conclusion that "[i]t is the intent of
the legislature to stress that the primary duty of a law enforcement officer when
responding to a domestic violence call is to enforce the laws allegedly violated
and to protect the victim.,,197 The court reasoned that "this mandate compels
[it] to conclude that this immunity [for failure to arrest] is inapplicable to
domestic violence matters. ,,198
Aside from near parallel fact patterns, these two cases share many other
similarities. First, the Massachusetts statute contains a mandatory arrest
provision that is almost identical to New Jersey's domestic violence law. 199
Further, the Tort Claims Acts in both states share practically indistinguishable
provisions that provide immunity to the police for failing to execute arrests. 200
The Massachusetts Tort Claims Act contains a specific savings clause that
prevents it from superseding other existing laws of the state. 201 The New
Jersey court interpreted the legislative intent of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act
to conclude that when the two bodies of legislation appeared to conflict, the
domestic violence directives prevailed.
The New Jersey Legislature's intent in passing the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Act was "to stress that the primary duty of a law enforcement officer
when responding to a domestic violence call is to enforce the laws allegedly
violated and to protect the victim." 202 Although the Massachusetts domestic
violence statute does not contain a specific section outlining legislative intent, it
contains a similarly strong declaration that "[t]he safety of the victim and any
involved children shall be paramount in any decision to arrest." 203
protection services."
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. § 59:5-4, :5-5.
See Campbell, 682 A.2d at 275 (concluding immunity not applicable in domestic abuse cases).
Jd. (interpreting New Jersey Legislature's statutory language).
Id.

Id. (identifying conflict between each statute).
See infra notes 204-205 and accompanying

text (commenting upon similarities shared between
mandatory arrest statutes in Massachusetts and New Jersey).
200. See supra notes 66-83 and accompanying text (highlighting pertinent language from Massachusetts
Tort Claims Act); infra notes 204-205 and accompanying text (identifying pertinent language from the New
Jersey Tort Claims Act).
201. See supra notes 194-196 and accompanying text (stating savings clause from Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act).
202. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-18 (West 1995) (discussing motivation of New Jersey Legislature for
enacting statute).
203. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6(7)(c) (2002).
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In light of the similarities shared between each statute, why did these two
cases tum out so differently? Why did the Massachusetts appeals court hold
that the Town of Grafton, through its police department, was negligent and in
violation of the domestic violence law for failing to arrest James but not
ultimately liable? As noted in Part I, the judicial and legislative branches in
Massachusetts have long engaged in volleys over the question of municipal
liability. Unfortunately, Catherine Ford appears to be an unwitting and
unfortunate victim of the court's unwillingness to hold the government liable
for its negligence without clear direction from the legislature. As discussed in
the final section, the reluctant Massachusetts judiciary clearly requires more
than just contrary case law from other jurisdictions to convince it that the law
does not immunize the police for failure to arrest in domestic violence
situations.
B. Special Relationship

Catherine Ford next argued that she essentially had a special relationship
with the Grafton police that removed the general immunity provided by the
Act's codification of the public duty rule. As described in Part I of this Article,
the concept of the special relationship evolved as an exception to the common
law public duty rule, which holds that a breach of duty to the general public
does not give rise to private tort causes of action. In order to be excepted from
the public duty rule, a plaintiff must demonstrate that a special relationship
existed between herself and the governmental entity. The Act was a legislative
attempt to replace the common law concept of sovereign immunity and the
public duty rule with a more carefully tailored and clearly defined set of
immunity rules. These concepts did not disappear entirely, however. The
public duty rule appears codified in the Act's grant of immunity for failing to
provide general services. Further, the Act codifies the special relationship
doctrine in one of the exceptions to immunity, i.e. that immunity shall not apply
to
any claim based upon explicit and specific assurances of safety or assistance,
beyond general representations that investigation or assistance will be or has
been undertaken, made to the direct victim or ~ member of his family or
household by a public employee, provided that the injury resulted in part from
reliance on those assurances. 204

In order to demonstrate the existence of her special relationship with the
Grafton police, Catherine relied upon the doctrine as codified by the Act.
Although juxtaposed with the Act's codification of the public duty rule, its text
nonetheless declares that governmental entities may not be held immune from
claims in which they provided the victim with "explicit and specific assurances

204. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § IOU){l).
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of safety or assistance, beyond general representations that investigation or
assistance will be or has been undertaken.,,205 The Act, however, requires that
the victim's injury must have occurred as a result of the victim's reliance on
such assurances.,,206 The text concludes that a "permit, certificate, or report of
findings of an investigation or inspection shall not constitute such assurance of
safety or assistance. ,,207
Relying upon this language, Catherine argued that this exception applied to
the facts of her case because the police directly assured her that she was
receiving all of the available protections under chapter 209A. She further
contended that the legislature's enactment of applicable domestic violence
legislation, as well as the court's issuance of her protective restraining order,
constituted "assurances of safety or assistance by individuals in the town's
police department.,,208 As previously noted, the appeals court rejected these
arguments and found the exception inapplicable. 209
In this section, we discuss decisions rendered by six state courts. Each of
these courts concluded that the police in question were not immune from
liability for negligently assisting a domestic violence victim. We conclude that
the Massachusetts appeals court could have reached the same decision in the
Ford case. Unlike the cases described in the previous discussion concerning
the "savings clause" argument made by Ford, the decisions we describe in this
section do not present exact analogies to the Ford case for one significant
reason: none of the legislatures of the states from which these decisions come
had codified the special relationship doctrine the way Massachusetts had. The
Massachusetts judiciary could have, therefore, concluded that these cases did
not constitute even persuasive authority, particularly in light of the legislative
and judicial wrangling that framed the Ford case.
However, these cases present exact analogies to the Ford case in a more
significant and fundamental sense. All these states' legislatures share with
Massachusetts the intent to provide protection to victims of domestic violence.
Indeed, in some states, the domestic violence legislation is not as broad or farreaching as that of Massachusetts, and even in those states, the courts found
that a special relationship existed between the victim of domestic violence and
the police. We therefore suggest that Massachusetts appeals court could have
carried out the legislature's clear intentions by concluding that a special
relationship existed between Catherine and the police. The following cases
offer examples of how the appeals court might have reached such a conclusion.
Within this context, five variations on the special relationship theme exist.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
claims).

Jd.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 100)(1).
[d.
See Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047, 1053-54 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998).
See supra notes 139-141, 143-148 and accompanying text (detailing court's analysis of Catherine's
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Each argument relies upon slightly different evidence and circumstance to find
that a special relationship existed between the police department and a victim
of domestic violence who received a restraining order.
In Campbell v. Campbell,21O the New Jersey Superior Court found that, in
addition to the previously described savings clause, the police lacked immunity
for failing to arrest Michael Campbell. 2l1 The court reasoned that the
restraining order Joanne Campbell had against Michael "established a 'special
relationship' between the Plainfield police and plaintiff, which creates an
exception to the immunity statute.,,212 The court described this special
relationship as "one that is created when the police assume a protective duty
towards the plaintiff, either through a promise or by conduct, thereby inducing
the plaintiffs reliance on their protection.,,213 This description appears to
closely resemble the Act's codification of the special relationship doctrine. 214
In concluding that the victim and the police shared a special relationship, the
court provided a detailed analysis of applicable law. The court noted that the
state's domestic violence law required officers to arrest violators of the
order. 215 As a result, the holder of a restraining order possesses the right to rely
on the order for protection from an abuser. Essentially, the court determined,
the order creates a promise by the police to protect the plaintiff by enforcing the
order. The court held that this promise created "a special relationship between
the plaintiff and the police officers which exempts it from the immunity
statute.,,216
The Massachusetts restraining order statute similarly contains a promise to
protect, given that both the Massachusetts and New Jersey police bear a duty to
arrest one who violates a restraining order.217 In light of Catherine Ford's
possession of a restraining order, the Massachusetts appeals court could have
found that the police provided her with "explicit and specific assurances of
safety or assistance." Furthermore, the court could have reasoned that
Catherine's injuries resulted "in part from reliance on those assurances.,,218

210. 682 A.2d 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1996).
211. See supra notes 206-208 and accompanying text (providing summary of court's analysis).
212. Campbell, 682 A.2d at 275 (reasoning immunity unavailable for officer who failed to execute arrest in
domestic violence matter).
213. Id. (noting adoption of special relationship employed by California courts).
214. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (discussing codification of special duty rule).
215. See Campbell, 682 A.2d at 276 (reasoning court order created special relationship between police and
plaintiff).
216. Id. (evaluating relationship between police and a plaintiff who had a restraining order).
217. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 258, § 10(j)(1)(2002).
218. Id. (stating claims and indemnity procedure for Commonwealth). The statute renders the Act's
immunity provisions inapplicable to claims based upon "explicit and specific assurances of safety or
assistance." /d. These assurances, however, must go beyond "general representations that investigation or
assistance will be or has been undertaken, made to the direct victim or a member of his family or household by
a public employee, provided that the injury resulted in part from reliance on those assurances." Id.
Furthermore, a "permit, certificate or report of fmdings of an investigation or inspection shall not constitute
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This finding would have thereby conferred liability onto the police under the
exemption to the ACt. 219
In Donaldson v. City of Seattle/ 20 the Washington Court of Appeals framed
the argument in a slightly different way. The Donaldson court held that
Washington's Domestic Violence Protection Act created a special relationship
between the holder of a restraining order and the police department. 221 By
identifying a specific class of people to be protected, the statute removed
situations involving restraining orders from the police force's duty to protect
the populace. Once this specific class of victims fell outside the general
populace, the police became liable whenever they negligently failed to enforce
.. orders. 222
restrammg
On May 29, 1985, Leola Washington filed for a temporary order of
protection against Steven Barnes, her boyfriend of about three years. Although
she received the order, the authorities never entered it into the Washington
Criminal Information System. In August, a court sentenced Steven for
malicious mischief regarding the May incident that first prompted Leola to file
for the protective order. The court also ordered Steven to refrain from having
any contact with Leola. Again, the state system failed to receive any
notification of the "no contact" order.
Over the following months, Leola and Steven shared sporadic, yet amicable
contact. On December 14, 1985, after spending the night together, they began
to argue and Steven became physically abusive. Attempting to escape, Leola
managed to leave her home and ran screaming to a neighbor's house. Although
Steven followed her and threatened to kill her, he soon left and Leola called the
police. Two officers arrived at her house, and Leola informed them of the no
contact order. After conducting a radio check, the officers failed to produce a
record of the order. Unfortunately, Leola could not locate her copy of the
document. Nonetheless, the officers obtained Steven's description and began
to search the area. After searching for him without success, the police offered
to take Leola to a shelter or to a family member. Leola declined the offer. The
next morning, Steven entered Leola's home and stabbed her to death.

such assurances of safety or assistance." Id.
219. See generally Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1999). In Mathews, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that an order of protection "specifically identified [the plaintifl] and was issued solely for
the purpose of protecting her." /d. at 165. As a result, the court reasoned that the plaintiff had apparently relied
on the court's order of protection. Id. The court premised its conclusion upon the common law public duty
rule. and held that the police had a "special duty" to protect the plaintiff and therefore were not entitled to
immunity. Id. Like Massachusetts. Tennessee's domestic violence law features a mandatory arrest provision.
See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-61 I (a) (2004) (outlining arrest procedure for violation of court order). The
statute provides that an "[0 ]fficer shall arrest without warrant if the officer has reasonable cause to believe that
the respondent has violated or is in violation of an order of protection." Id. (emphasis added).
220. 831 P.2d 1098 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992).
221. Id.atII05.
222. See id. at 1101.
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The administratix of Leola's estate brought a wrongful death action against
several parties, including the City of Seattle. The city argued, in part, that the
public duty rule barred any liability for negligence. After examining its merits,
the court rejected the city's argument. 223
The court founded its conclusion upon an examination of how the common
law public duty interacted with the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. 224 Such
analysis was necessary because Washington had yet to enact a specific tort
claims act.
Like its Massachusetts counterpart, Washington's Domestic Violence
Prevention Act contains a mandatory arrest provision.225 In addition, the
Domestic Violence Prevention Act states that a police officer's primary duty
when responding to a domestic violence situation is to "enforce the laws
allegedly violated and to protect the complaining party.,,226 The Massachusetts
statute contains similarly strong language about the general duty of officers,
providing that "[t]he safety of the victim and any involved children shall be
paramount in any decision to arrest.,,227
The Washington court found that the Domestic Violence Prevention Act
"does not create new laws prohibiting domestic violence, but requires police
and other law enforcement bodies to better enforce the current laws in order to
protect the victims of domestic violence.,,228 This requirement creates a duty
on the part of the city to protect particular individuals by identifying them as a
class, and by setting forth the specific duties of the police.229 Accordingly, the
court rejected the city's claim that it owed no special duty to Leola and was
therefore immune from liability?30
The underlying facts in the Ford case are even more compelling. Unlike the
Washington case, the Grafton police had ample notice and knowledge of both
the restraining order and the history of violence between Catherine and James.
Chapter 209A of the Massachusetts General Laws defines victims of domestic
violence who have restraining orders as a particular class of individuals that

223. ld. (rejecting city's claim).
224. Donaldson, 831 P .2d at 110 I.
225. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.99.030(6) (2002). The statute declares that "when a peace officer responds to
a domestic violence call and has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, the peace officer
shall exercise arrest powers with reference to the criteria in RCW 10.31.100." ld. Section 10.31.100 outlines
criteria for a warrantless arrest based on a domestic violence violation. ld. § 10.31.100. Additionally, section
10.99.055 reiterates the job of the peace officer by declaring that he "shall enforce an order issued by any Court
in this state restricting a defendant's ability to have contact with a victim by arresting and taking the defendant
into custody, when the officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of that
order." ld. § 10.99.055.
226. ld. § 10.99.030(5) (describing duty of police officer in domestic violence situation).
227. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 209A, § 6(7)(c) (2002).
228. Donaldson v. City of Seattle, 831 P.2d 1098, 1101 (Wash. Ct. App. 1992) (basing such finding on
legislative intent).
229. ld.
230. ld.
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require special protection. Moreover, chapter 209A sets forth the specific
duties of the police to provide special protection by requiring them to arrest
individuals whom they suspect are violating those restraining orders. This
legislative delineation of a specific class, coupled with an enumeration of
specific duties owed by the police to this particular group, certainly appears to
create the type of special relationship between the police and restraining order
recipients that would fall within the immunity exception of the Act. Although
the Donaldson court extended the immunity exception to such a relationship,
the Massachusetts appeals court failed to reach a similar conclusion.
Unlike the Massachusetts statute, Washington's Domestic Violence
Prevention Act contains a clear statement of legislative purpose. Its language
declares that the Act seeks to "recognize the importance of domestic violence
as a serious crime against society and to assure the victim of domestic violence
the maximum protection from abuse which the law and those who enforce the
law can provide.,,23l This statement of intent persuaded the Donaldson court to
impose a duty on the City of Seattle to protect victims of domestic violence. 232
Perhaps a similar statement in the Massachusetts statute would have helped the
Ford court achieve a like result.
The final two cases come from Florida and New York. Both states,
however, have adopted domestic violence statutes that lack mandatory arrest
provlSlons. Despite this divergence from Massachusetts law, both states
concluded in their cases that the holder of a restraining order shared a special
relationship with their police departments. As a result, the judiciary in each
state held that the police were not immune from liability for their failure to
enforce valid restraining orders.
In Simpson v. City of Miami,233 the Florida appeals court held that Florida's
domestic violence legislation placed victims into a "special category of crime
victim.,,234 The court reasoned that the creation of this particular category
established a special relationship between the victim and the "responsible
governmental entity.,,235 In this case, the court issued a per curiam opinion that
reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint on sovereign
immunity grounds. 236 The court also produced an impassioned concurring
opinion that described an all-too-familiar set of circumstances.
In June of 1993, Morena Simpson obtained a Permanent Injunction for
Protection Against Domestic Violence that prohibited Carl Hurd from

231. WASH. REv. CODE § 10.99.010 (2004).
232. See Donaldson, 831 P.2d at 1101 (concluding statute provides basis for city's duty to protect victims
of domestic violence).
233. 700 So. 2d 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
234. [d. at 89.
235. Id. (concluding lcgislation established relationship between victim and governmental entity).
236. [d. at 88.
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237
"committing any abuse, threats or harassment" against her.
In March of the
following year, Carl traveled to Morena's house, threatened to kill her, and then
left. Morena immediately reported Carl's threat to the City of Miami Police
Department. Officers in the department had responded to previous incidents
between Carl and Morena, so they understood that the couple had shared a
volatile relationship. After the police confirmed that Morena had a valid
protective injunction, they dispatched an officer to the scene. Upon arrival, the
officer found Carl and placed him into his police car. Carl, however, managed
to convince the officer to release him, and promised that he would leave
Morena alone. The next day Carl, "not unexpectedly," went back to Morena's
238
home and shot her to death.
Betty Simpson, as the representative of Morena Simpson's estate, brought an
action against the city alleging that "the domestic violence protection statute
created special protection for the benefit of domestic violence victims.,,239
Simpson further contended that "the decedent was within the special protective
sphere of the statute and that by releasing Hurd ... the officer breached his
duty of care to Morena Simpson.,,240
The trial court granted the city's motion to dismiss the complaint on the
241
grounds that the Florida Tort Claims Act provided immunity to public actors.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court's decision, however, and
ultimately held that the City of Miami's police department was not immune
"because there was a special relationship between the plaintiff s decedent and
the police department, and the officer owed the decedent a duty of care. ,,242
In the concurring opinion, Judge Shevin explained that courts issue
protective injunctions "pursuant to the Florida Legislature's special protective
measures addressing the ever-growing horrors of domestic violence in our
society.,,243 Therefore, because the state's legal system had taken such
measures to protect Morena from future abuse, Judge Shevin concluded that
Morena shared a special relationship with the police?44 At the foundation of
these measures, the Florida Legislature constructed "a special category of crime
victim and established a special relationship between the decedent in this case
and the responsible governmental entity.,,245 As this language implies, the

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Simpson, 700 So. 2d at 88 (describing restraints set forth by injunction).
See Simpson, 700 So. 2d at 88.
Id.
Id.
See Simpson v. City of Miami, 700 So. 2d 87, 88 (Fla. Ct. App. 1997) (citing

FLA. STAT. ch. 768.28

(2004».
(identifying special relationship between decedent and police officer).
(Shevin, J., concurring) (discussing reasons for enactment of special protection measures); see
FLA. STAT. ch. 741.29-.31 (2004).
244. See Simpson, 700 So. 2d 87, 88-89 (Shevin, J., concurring) (noting establishment of special
relationship).
245. Jd. at 89 (Shevin, J., concurring) (observing legislative deference to special relationship).
242. Jd.
243. Id.
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legislature enacted these laws to dictate police conduct in response to domestic
violence conditions. 246
Massachusetts enforces a domestic violence law that, with even greater
clarity, dictates the "special measures" that police officers must take to protect
the same "special category of crime victim." The state requires police officers
to arrest those who appear in violation of restraining orders designed to protect
the special category of crime victim. Why then, when the Massachusetts
statute contains much stronger language, did the Massachusetts appeals court
refuse to fmd the same special relationship that the Florida court found to exist
between Morena and the police? Moreover, why were the Grafton police able
to successfully claim immunity?
Twelve years earlier, the New York Court of Appeals reached the same
conclusion as the Florida court despite the absence of legislation containing a
mandatory arrest provision. In Sorichetti v. City of New York,247 Josephine
Sorichetti obtained a temporary order of protection against her husband, Frank,
forbidding him to "assault, menace, harass, endanger, threaten, or act in a
disorderly manner" toward her. 248 The court finalized this order for the
duration of one year, and included a provision granting Frank weekly visitation
privileges with their daughter, Dina, that extended from 10 a.m. Saturday until
6 p.m. on Sunday. The order adhered to the Family Court Act § 168, by
reciting:
The presentation of this Certificate to any Peace Officer shall constitute
authority for said Peace Officer to take into custody the person charged with
violating the tenns of such Order of Protection and bring said person before the
Court and otherwise, so far as lies within his power, to aid the Petitioner in
securing the protection such Order was intended to afford?49

When the following weekend arrived, Josephine delivered Dina to Frank in
front of the forty-third precinct at the appointed visitation time. As he walked
away with the child, Frank turned to Josephine and shouted, "You, I'm going to
kill you." He then pointed to his daughter and said "You better do the sign of
the cross before this weekend is up." He then made the sign of the cross on
himself 250
Interpreting this communication as a death threat, Josephine reported the
incident to an officer at the police station. She then presented the order of
protection to the officer, reported that Frank had just threatened her and her
child, and requested that the officer retrieve Dina and arrest Frank. The officer
told Josephine that he could not help her because Frank had not touched her or

246. Id. (Shevin, J., concurring) (describing effects oflegislation).
247. 482 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 1985).
248. Id. at 72-73 (reciting language of protection order).
249. Id. at 73.
250. Id. (reciting threats directed by Frank to Josephine).
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otherwise harmed her in a physical manner?51
On the following evening, Josephine confronted the police again and
attempted for ninety minutes to persuade them to intervene. Despite their
knowledge of Frank's violent tendencies, the police refused to act. Rather, the
lieutenant in charge told Josephine to leave her number and go home.
While Josephine unsuccessfully pleaded for assistance, Frank's sister arrived
home to her apartment. Upon entering, she found Frank lying unconscious next
to an emptied bottle of whiskey. Although an hour had passed since Frank was
supposed to have returned Dina to her mother, Frank's sister found the young
child at the apartment as well-permanently disabled after Frank had severely
beaten her.
Josephine and her daughter brought an action against the City of New York
for the police department's failure to enforce the restraining order. The trial
court denied the city's motion to dismiss, reasoning that it could be held liable
to a third person "for breach of a special duty of care ... [owed] to the holder
of an order of protection.,,252 The case went to trial and the jury returned a
verdict for Josephine and Dina.253
Although the city appealed, the court of appeals affirmed the jury's
verdict. 254 The court began its discussion by describing the common-law
public duty rule and the special relationship exception. 255 The appellate body
then declared that the city shared a special relationship with the plaintiffs that
had arisen from numerous factors. The court pointed to Josephine's order of
protection, the department's knowledge of Frank's violent history, the
existence of the order of protection, and its understanding of the specific
situation in which the child had been placed?56 In addition, the court identified
the police department's response to Josephine's pleas for assistance on the day
ofthe assault, as well as her "reasonable expectation of police protection.,,257
New York's relevant domestic violence legislation is housed in the Family
Court Act section 168, which describes situations in which a police officer can
arrest a suspected perpetrator of domestic violence. 258 As noted earlier, New
York's legislation diverges from Massachusetts law because it does not require
(discussing officer's rationale for failing to arrest Frank).
at 74 (noting possible situations where police department would not be liable to victim).
at 72 (acknowledging jury verdict).
Id. at 77.
255. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 74 (N.Y. 1985) (noting common-law rule). The rule
states that "a municipality cannot be held liable for injuries resulting from a failure to provide adequate police
protection absent a special relationship existing between the municipality and the injured party." Id. (citing
DeLong v. County of Erie, 457 N.E.2d 719 (N.Y. 1983)).
256. Id. at 75 (identifying relevant factors in case).
257. Id. (noting court's deciding factors).
258. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168 (McKinney 2002). The rule states that the "presentation of a copy of an
order of protection or temporary order of protection ... to any peace officer, acting pursuant to his special
duties, or police officer shall constitute authority for him to arrest a person charged with violating the terms of
such order." Id.
251.
252.
253.
254.

Sorichetti, 482 N.E.2d at 73

Id.
!d.
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the police to arrest someone whom they suspect has violated a restraining
order. Rather, the presentation of a restraining order, "along with an allegation
that the order has been violated, obligates the officer to investigate and take
.
.
,,259
appropnate actIon.
Based on the language of the statute, which is significantly less stringent
than the corresponding Massachusetts law, the New York Court of Appeals
found sufficient contact between Josephine and Dina and the police to find a
special relationship. As in other cases, the court reached this conclusion based
on the legislative creation of a specific class of people that required such
protection. The court noted that an order of protection represents a "preincident legislative and judicial determination that its holder should be
accorded a reasonable degree of protection from a particular individual.,,260
The court added that this class is necessarily limited by the terms of the
order?61
The New York Court of Appeals further buffered its conclusion by referring
to the legislature's purpose for creating the Family Court Act. The court stated
that the legislature sought "to encourage police involvement in domestic
matters, an area in which the police traditionally have exhibited a reluctance to
intervene.,,262 As in Massachusetts, the Family Court Act does not contain any
sections describing legislative intent. Rather, the court relied on statements
published in the Practice Commentaries that follow the statute in the annotated
book.263
Recall that the Massachusetts Legislature passed the domestic violence
legislation to provide domestic violence victims with a practical tool for
dealing with and stopping abuse in the midst of a domestic crisis. The statute
provides victims with clearly-delineated rights, and informs police of their
mandatory duties. 264 When applying the reasoning of the New York Court of
Appeals to the Ford case, the Massachusetts appeals court could have
concluded that the legislature's creation of chapter 209A-which defines police
duties specifically to include a mandatory duty to arrest, and which clearly
delineates the class of victims to be protected--demonstrated that Catherine
Ford and the police share sufficient contact to justify denying immunity to the
police.
Yet, the Massachusetts appeals court seemed unable or unwilling to find the
police liable for negligence, even though it possessed numerous ways to do so.
In fact, the Ford court appeared so fearful of reversal by the Supreme Judicial

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See Sorichetti, 482 N.E.2d at 75.
Id
[d. at 76.
[d. at 75.
Sorichetti v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 70, 75 (N.Y. 1985) (citing Douglas Beshrov's Practice
Commentary to N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 168 (McKinney 2002».
264. See Triantafillou, supra note 156, at 22-23.
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Court that it refused to enforce the savings clause of the Act without a specific
command from the legislature that the domestic violence statute supercedes the
immunity statute. This court seemed so cowed by previous narrow definitions
of "specific assurances" that it refused find a special duty on the part of the
police to enforce restraining orders. Rather, the court required a specific
command from the legislature that restraining orders are indeed "specific
assurances" that confers upon the recipient a special relationship with law
enforcement. The court told Catherine that her restraining order, despite
arising out of a complex and comprehensive body of legislation designed
specifically to protect her, was only as good as James' ability to abide by its
terms or an individual officer's. willingness to assist her. In the wake of this
decision, the court left police with the message that the best way to avoid
liability is to give victims of domestic violence the "specific assurance" that the
police can do nothing to help them and that they are better off buying
themselves gunS.265
As a result of its current position, Massachusetts stands as the only state in
the nation that refuses to acknowledge that a special relationship is created
when a domestic violence victim holds a restraining order and a police
department negligently fails to enforce it. 266 Is this really consistent with
Massachusetts' well-deserved reputation as forward-thinking and effective in
preventing domestic violence? Is this really what the legislature intended to do
when it crafted the complex and far-reaching chapter 209A legislation?
Without a clearer message from the legislature regarding what it did intend to
happen in these circumstances, the Massachusetts judiciary continues to
interpret the Act to immunize police when they fail to enforce a restraining
order.

IV.

CONCLUSION:

AN INVITATION TO THE LEGISLATURE AND A WARNING

In the final paragraph of the Ford opinion, the appeals court reflected upon
the emotional backdrop of its decision. Quoting the United States Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social
Services, the court recalled that "[j]udges and lawyers, like other humans, are
265. See generally Ford v. Town of Grafton, 693 N.E.2d 1047 (Mass. App. Ct 1998).
266. At the time that Ford was decided, many states had already ruled that plaintiffs could not recover in
such situations. These decisions, however, were made based upon legal or factual elements not present in the
Ford case, or in the state's previously described legal landscape. See generally Calloway v. Kinkelaar, 659
N.E.2d 1322 (III. 1995). Calloway, while factually analogous, is statutorily distinguishable; the Illinois'
Domestic Violence Act limits officers' and municipalities' liability to "willful and wanton conduct" Illinois
Domestic Violence Act, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 60/101 (1986). The court determined that the complaint did not
sufficiently allege such conduct, so did not address the "special duty" question. Calloway, 659 N.E.2d at 1329;
see also Ardoin v. City of Mamou, 685 So. 2d 294 (La. Ct App. 1996). The Ardoin court concluded that
Louisiana's Domestic Abuse Assistance Act did not create a special duty because the plain language of the
statute indicates that police officers are authorized rather ·than mandated to execute an arrest 685 So. 2d at
299.
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moved by natural sympathy in a case like this to find a way for [Catherine
Ford] to receive adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted upon
[her].,,267 The court proceeded to caution, however, that those same judges and
lawyers-and particularly the court itself-"are bound by our Constitutions and
laws.,,268 The appeals court interpreted those laws to mean that the judiciary
remained powerless to act on behalf of Catherine Ford, and that only "the
people of Massachusetts may choose by legislation to hold towns and their
officials accountable in situations like this one. ,,269
Given what we know about the history of the Massachusetts Tort Claims Act
and what we see the court unable to bring itself to do in light of that history, the
ball appears in the legislature's court to address what the Ford case represents.
In this final section, we suggest ways in which the legislature could take steps
to remedy what is at best a confused landscape, and at worst a counterproductive and frustrating body of interrelated law. We conclude by providing
a description of how dangerous this landscape actually is for victims of
domestic violence and their families.
As previously noted, the judiciary requires guidance from a source more
local and controlling than contrary case law from other jurisdictions. Bearing
those persuasive cases in mind, the Massachusetts Legislature could take two
actions that would help convince the reluctant Massachusetts judiciary that it
intends to require police to enforce restraining orders or face liability for their
failure to do so.
First, the legislature could add a statement of legislative intent to chapter
209A. This statement would clearly state that the duty to enforce the chapter's
provisions is of the highest priority. It would further provide that failure to
enforce those laws would serve as grounds for liability on the part of the public
employee, notwithstanding contrary provisions within the Tort Claims Act.
Such a statement would reinforce both the savings clause of the Torts Claims
Act, as well as the legislature's commitment to providing protection for victims
of domestic violence. With that amendment, the Massachusetts judiciary might
feel empowered, as did the courts of New Jersey and Washington, to fmd
public employees liable for failing to enforce restraining orders. 270
In the alternative, the Massachusetts Legislature could take less subtle
courses of action. For instance, lawmakers could amend the Tort Claims Act or
chapter 209A to clarify that the holder of a restraining order has entered into a
special relationship with the government and is thus entitled to special
protection. Put another way, the amendment could provide that the issuance of
267. Ford, 693 N.E.2d at 1057 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc.
189,202-03 (1989}).

Serv.,

489

U.S.

268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See supra notes 206-208, 238-240 and accompanying text (noting example of court focusing on
legislative intent of domestic violence act).

HeinOnline -- 38 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 601 2004-2005

602

SUFFOLK UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVIII:557

a chapter 209A restraining order acts as a "specific assurance" of safety and
protection from the court and the police department. Having granted this
specific assurance, a public employee, as a representative of the court system or
police department, would then lose any entitlement to the general immunity
provided by section lO(h) of the Act.
What if the legislature takes none of these steps, and ultimately refrains from
attempting to clarify the relationship between these two legislative schemes?
Beyond its departure from Massachusetts' clear commitment to provide
protection to victims of domestic violence, the ramifications of the Ford
decision seem immense. The holding in Ford essentially declares that
obtaining a restraining order possesses meaning only if the batterer complies
with its terms. By refusing to find the police liable for their failure to enforce
the protections promised in Catherine Ford's restraining order, the Ford court
declares that restraining orders do not provide special protections. In reality,
the decision to obtain a restraining order can be a terrifying and dangerous one
for a victim of domestic violence. Not only has the victim attempted to escape
a violent situation, but she has also taken a step to remove herself from her
batterer-a step that often infuriates the batterer even more, thus placing the
victim at an even greater risk. 271 Without the special protection promised on its
face, as well as in its legislation, a restraining order becomes a mere piece of
paper. In fact, it becomes worse than just a piece of paper because its issuance
increases the risk of harm that a battered woman must face while providing no
greater amount of protection.
The Supreme Court's decision in DeShaney effectively removed the
possibility of federal recourse for victims of domestic violence. 272 As a result
of this holding, state actors stand as the only remaining providers of safety nets
for people like Catherine Ford and Karen Trudeau. But as Florida's Judge
Shevin warns in her concurring opinion in the Simpson case:
If the domestic violence protection statutes are to have real meaning or impact,
law enforcement personnel must play an integral role in advancing the
legislative protection scheme. The officers are the persons charged with
implementing the legislature's safeguards and ensuring the success of the
statutory provisions. If law enforcement agencies and personnel are shielded
from liability for failing to carry out the very protections established by the
legislature, then domestic violence injunction legislation is virtually
meaningless and does not offer domestic violence victims any real protection
. . .. To require anything less eviscerates the injunction and renders it a mere
advisory court action that violators really need not heed?73

Is this really where we want to end up?
271. See Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L.
REv. 371, 394-95 (1993) (weighing options available to battered women).
272. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
273. Simpson v. City of Miami, 700 So. 2d 87, 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (Shevin, J., concurring).
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